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Abstract
While one always works to prevent attacks and failures, they are inevitable
and situational awareness is key to taking appropriate action. Monitoring
plays an integral role in ensuring reliability and security of computing sys-
tems. Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) clouds significantly lower the barrier
for obtaining scalable computing resources and allow users to focus on what
is important to them. Can a similar service be offered to provide on-demand
reliability and security monitoring?
Cloud computing systems are typically built using virtual machines (VMs).
VM monitoring takes advantage of this and uses the hypervisor that runs
VMs for robust reliability and security monitoring. The hypervisor provides
an environment that is isolated from failures and attacks inside customers’
VMs. Furthermore, as a low-level manager of computing resources, the hy-
pervisor has full access to the infrastructure running above it. Hypervisor-
based VM monitoring leverages that information to observe the VMs for fail-
ures and attacks. However, existing VM monitoring techniques fall short of
“as-a-service” expectations because they require a priori VM modifications
and require human interaction to obtain necessary information about the
underlying guest system. The research presented in this dissertation closes
those gaps by providing a flexible VM monitoring framework and automated
analysis to support that framework.
We have developed and tested a dynamic VM monitoring framework called
Hypervisor Probes (hprobes). The hprobe framework allows us to monitor
the execution of both the guest OS and applications from the hypervisor. To
supplement this monitoring framework, we use dynamic analysis techniques
to investigate the relationship between hardware events visible to the hyper-
visor and OS constructs common across OS versions. We use the results of
this analysis to parametrize the hprobe-based monitors without requiring any
user input. Combining the dynamic VM monitoring framework and analysis
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frameworks allows us to provide on-demand hypervisor based monitors for
cloud VMs.
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Chapter 1
Introduction
1.1 Motivation
Cloud computing allows users to obtain scalable computing resources to sim-
plify setting up and running a scalable computing environment. However,
cloud systems do not provide a mechanism by which users can protect their
rented resources against accidental failures and malicious attacks. When it
comes to making those systems reliable and secure, current cloud computing
systems leave users in the same situation as if they were still running their
own infrastructure. With growing threats and a rapidly changing landscape
of attack and failure modes, what is needed is a method for alleviating the
amount of effort and skill cloud users need in order to protect their rented
resources.
Prolific failures have kept reliability as a foremost concern for customers
considering the cloud [1]. Monitoring is especially important for security
since many attacks go undetected for long periods of time. For example,
Trustwave surveyed 574 locations that were victims of cyber attacks [2]. Of
those 574 locations, 81% of the victims did not detect the attacks themselves
(either a customer reported data misuse or a 3rd party audit uncovered a
compromised system). In the cases where attacks were detected, the mean
detection time was 86 days.
Cloud computing environments are often built on top of virtual machines
(VMs) running on top of a hypervisor. A virtual machine is a complete
computing system that runs on top of another system. The hypervisor is a
privileged software component that manages the VMs. Typically, one can
run multiple VMs on top of a single hypervisor, which is often how cloud
providers distribute customers across multiple physical servers. As the low-
level manager of VMs, the hypervisor has privileged access to those VMs and
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this access is often supported by hardware-enforced isolation. The strong iso-
lation between the hypervisor and VMs provides an opportunity for robust
security monitoring. Because cloud environments are often built using hyper-
visor technology, VM monitoring can be used to protect cloud systems. How-
ever, existing VM monitoring systems are unsuitable for cloud environments
as those monitoring systems require extensive user involvement to configure
monitoring or when handling multiple operating system (OS) versions.
In this dissertation, we present a VM monitoring system that is suitable
for cloud environments to provide Reliability and Security as a Service. By
providing reliability and security monitoring as a service we can alleviate
customers’ concerns about their lack of awareness in cloud systems. In the
system we envision, the cloud provider develops a set of monitors which are
offered to the users. Since cloud providers have many experts on hand and
vast experience with running large systems, providing as-a-service monitors
in this fashion is a way by which that experience can be shared with customers
without sacrificing the customers’ independence.
1.2 Challenges
Failures and attacks demand a response beyond what current virtual machine
(VM) monitoring solutions offer. Those monitoring systems often require
guest operating system (OS) modifications, cannot be modified at runtime,
and cannot monitor the execution of user programs. This lack of flexibility
and high implementation complexity make many monitoring systems unsuit-
able for use in most IT environments.
There has been significant research on virtual machine monitoring [3–8].
Existing VM monitoring systems require setup and configuration as part of
the guest OS boot process or modification of guest OS internals. In either
case, the effect on the guest is the same: at the bare minimum a VM reboot
is necessary to adapt the monitoring system; in the worst case the guest
OS needs to be modified and recompiled. Operationally, these requirements
are undesirable for a number of reasons, e.g. due to increased downtime or
inflexibility when monitoring needs change.
In addition to the lack of runtime reconfigurability, VM monitoring is at
a disadvantage compared to traditional in-OS monitoring in terms of infor-
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mation available to the monitors. VM monitoring operates at the hypervisor
level, and therefore has access only to low-level hardware information, such
as registers and memory, with limited semantic information on what the
low-level information represents (e.g., what function is being called when the
call 0xabcd instruction is executed). In the literature, the hypervisor’s lack
of semantic information about the guest OS is referred to as the semantic
gap.
1.3 Contributions
One class of active monitoring systems is a hook based system, where the
monitor places hooks inside the target application or OS [5]. A hook is a
mechanism used to generate an event when the target executes a particular
instruction. When the target’s execution reaches the hook, control is trans-
fered to the monitoring system where it can record the event and/or inspect
the system’s state. Once the monitor has finished processing the event, it
returns control to the target system and execution continues until the next
event. Hook based techniques are robust against failures and attacks inside
the target when the monitoring system is properly isolated from the target
system.
We find dynamic hook-based systems attractive for as-a-service monitoring
as hook-based systems are adaptable: once the hook delivery mechanism
is functional, implementing a new monitor involves adding a hook location
and deciding how to process the event. In this case, dynamic refers to the
ability to add and remove hooks without disrupting the control flow of the
monitoring target (i.e., guest OS in the case of VM monitoring). Adaptability
is particularly important in production IT environments, where monitoring
needs to be configured for multiple applications and operational use cases.
In addition to supporting a variety of environments, monitoring must also be
responsive to changes in those environments (e.g., repurposing of computing
resources).
In this dissertation, we present the hprobe framework, a dynamic hook-
based VM reliability and security monitoring solution. The key contributions
of the hprobe framework are that it is loosely coupled from the target VM,
can inspect both the OS and user applications, and supports runtime in-
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sertion/removal of hooks. All of these aspects result in a VM monitoring
solution that is suitable for as-a-service monitoring on an actual production
system. We have built a prototype implementation using Hardware-Assisted
Virtualization that is integrated with the KVM hypervisor (Section 2.4). To
demonstrate monitoring using the hprobe framework, we constructed exam-
ple dectectors: an emergency security vulnerability detector, a heartbeat
detector, and an infinite loop detector (Chapter 5). While our prototype
framework shares some similarities and builds on previous VM monitoring
systems (Section 3.5), the example hprobe detectors could not have been
implemented on any existing platform.
The hprobe framework is still subject to the semantic gap challenge intro-
duced in the previous section. Namely, hprobe monitors still need a low-level
definition of a hook location (i.e., an address in memory) as well as pa-
rameters for the monitoring functionality (e.g., timeout values for reliability
detectors). In order to allow the hprobe system to be used in an as-a-service
monitoring system, we developed a method for bypassing the semantic gap by
abstracting across different versions of OSes through the use of OS constructs
common across versions (Chapter 6). Those OS constructs are leveraged so
that the hypervisor can access the appropriate information as necessitated
by the reliability and security monitors. This information is then used to
infer the VM’s state: i.e., detect erroneous or abnormal behavior.
Monitors developed using our technique are based on higher-level OS con-
cepts and are not dependent on version-specific data structure layouts or
variable names. For example, while traditional VM monitoring techniques
are effective for extracting a wealth of information from the guest OS, they
are often dependent on not only the OS family, but also the OS version.
If the data structure layout or structure member names change, the VM
monitoring system will need to be updated. This means that a VM moni-
toring system for a cloud-based service would need to include every possible
variation of data structure layout and type (e.g., structure members) for its
customer VMs. Furthermore, for every set of offsets and types, there will
also be a set of values that vary across more VMs (e.g., for each minor kernel
version). In our approach the monitors still interact using low-level opera-
tions (e.g., instructions, registers, memory reads and writes) as that is the
layer at which hypervisor-based systems operate. The detectors we design,
however, do not need to understand the low-level information such as which
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offset into a structure is the process ID; necessary low-level parameters are
automatically inferred through the use of OS constructs.
A cloud provider can leverage its systems expertise to design monitors
based on the frameworks developed throughout this dissertation and then
offer those monitors to cloud users. VM monitors based on these techniques
are suitable for a cloud environment. This alternative to traditional VM
monitoring allows a cloud provider to support monitoring across OS versions,
which is essential for a cloud environment where users have full control over
their VMs. The key research contributions of this dissertation are:
1. A dynamic VM monitoring system based on hardware-assisted virtual-
ization that is runtime adaptable,
2. A technique for obtaining low-level VM monitoring parameters that is
based on OS constructs common across multiple versions of an OS,
3. A reliability and security monitoring framework that does not modify a
cloud user’s VM or require input from the user other than a VM image
containing his or her specific OS and applications,
4. Sample monitors that demonstrate the range of monitoring one could
deploy using the dynamic monitoring system and Reliability and Secu-
rity as a Service framework.
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Chapter 2
System Virtualization
2.1 Emulation and QEMU
In the goal of running an entire computing system on top of another, one of
the most straightforward concepts is emulation: a piece of software that acts
as a CPU reads the machine code from the image of a system and translates
it to instructions that run natively on the host CPU. Emulation frequently
sees use in contexts where one wishes to run software from one instruction
set architecture (ISA) on another ISA (e.g., to run software compiled for
a mobile phone that uses ARM on an x86 machine). However, in many
cases one will simply wish to run a complete x86 system on top of another
x86 system (e.g., for OS development). One open-source emulator that is
very popular is the Quick EMUlator or QEMU [9]. The advantage of an
emulator like QEMU over other virtualization techniques is that emulators
do not require any hardware support and can also be used to run software
from vastly different ISAs on one another (e.g., RISC on CISC).
QEMU uses the concept of a host ISA (the ISA for the CPU running
QEMU on) and a target ISA (the ISA for the CPU QEMU is emulating). As
of writing, QEMU supports 15 target ISAs.1 A main design principle behind
QEMU is portability; as such, QEMU does not have software to translate
from every host to target ISA, but it uses an intermediary set of operations
called TCG ops. TCG ops are a RISC-like ISA and are named after the
software component, the tiny code generator, that performs the translation
from the target ISA to TCG ops. At runtime, QEMU translates the target
instructions into blocks of TCG ops called translated blocks (TBs). These
TBs are related to basic blocks from compiler theory: a translation block is a
set of instructions that end in a branch. Once a TB is translated from TCG
1http://wiki.qemu.org/Documentation/ISAManuals
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x86 target input:
0x002f1400: int $0x80
TCG ops:
---- 0x2f1400
movi_i32 tmp4,$0x2f1400
st_i32 tmp4,env,$0x20
movi_i32 tmp12,$0x2
movi_i32 tmp13,$0x80
movi_i64 tmp14,$raise_interrupt
call tmp14,$0x0,$0,tmp13,tmp12
x86 host out:
0x425d3a00: mov $0x2f1400,%ebp
0x425d3a05: mov %ebp,0x20(%r14)
0x425d3a09: mov $0x80,%edi
0x425d3a0e: mov $0x2,%esi
0x425d3a13: mov $0x7f07384191a0,%r10
0x425d3a1d: callq *%r10
Figure 2.1: An example of translating from an x86 target to an x86 host
using intermediary TCG ops in QEMU: the int $0x80 instruction
traditionally used to issue system calls on Linux. This code was generated
using the -d in asm,op,out asm arguments when running QEMU.
ops into the host ISA, it is placed into a translation cache (default 32MiB
in size). An example of the translation of one instruction (a legacy Linux
system call using int $0x80) from target x86 into TCG ops and finally into
host x86 is shown in Fig. 2.1.
From Fig. 2.1, we can see that one instruction in the target can lead to
many instructions in the host, even when the architecture is the same as in
the example. Note that the last TCG op and host instruction in the TB is
a call to another function, raise interrupt. The raise interrupt function
itself contains 123 instructions so one instruction in target x86 becomes 129
instructions in the host OS (note that this number was determined statically;
the control flow of raise interrupt may increase or decrease this amount).
A significant contributor to this explosion in the number of instructions exe-
cuted is handling interrupts and privileged operations: since QEMU is a user-
level process it must translate all privileged operations (like interrupt han-
dling and memory management operations) into user-level operations that
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emulate and manage the hardware state (e.g., the raise interrupt function).
The overall performance implications of emulation are significant: in ad-
dition to the inefficiencies of translating when a block does not exist in the
cache and the increase in number of instructions one can expect cache per-
formance to be impacted since the number of intermediary operations would
affect locality.
2.2 Virtualization
In this dissertation, the term “virtualization” will always refer to the idea of
system virtualization, or running a complete virtualized computing system
(i.e., operating system) on top of a physical computer. Emulation allows one
to run a complete virtual computer on top of a physical computer (even in
the case of differing ISAs), but introduces many overheads as described in
the previous section. When running a target and host of matching ISAs, it
would be preferred to skip all the intermediary steps and run the target code
directly on the host CPU (e.g., the int $0x80 instruction should just execute
int $0x80, not 129 other instructions). Virtualization is just that: running
a complete virtual or “guest” computer system on the native CPU as much
as possible.
The canonical work describing virtualization was published in 1974 by
Gerald Popek and Robert Golberg in 1974 [10]. Despite being published
in 1974, the Popek and Goldberg paper presented and discusses ideas that
are relevant and developing today (e.g., what Popek and Goldberg called
“Recursive Virtualization” is now called “Nested Virtualization,” which was
presented in OSDI 2010 [11] and added to upstream KVM in 2012).
To implement a virtualized environment, Popek and Goldberg presented
the idea of a virtual machine monitor (VMM) that runs on top of the hard-
ware and controls the underlying virtual machines (VMs). In his PhD thesis,
Goldberg made the distinction between two classes of VMMs that are still
in use today: the Type I hypervisor and the Type II hypervisor [12]. This
model for a VMM and Type I/II VMMs are illustrated in Fig. 2.2. A Type
I VMM is a VMM that runs directly on the physical machine, replacing the
host OS. A Type II VMM is a VMM that runs on top of the host OS (in
Goldberg’s original work, he described a Type II VMM as running on an “ex-
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Figure 2.2: The simple model for a Type I and Type II Virtual Machine
Monitor, as presented by Goldberg.
tended machine,” an additional abstraction offered by the OS). In both cases,
the VMM is responsible for managing virtual machines and plays a similar
role for VMs as an OS does for user-level applications. In many cases, the
VMM is referred to as the “hypervisor” since it has more control than the
guest OS or “supervisor.” The terms VMM and hypervisor will be used in-
terchangeably throughout this dissertation, but hypervisor has become the
more accepted term in enterprise IT and will be preferred in later chapters.
According to Popek and Goldberg, a virtualized system manage has the
following characteristics:
1. Essentially identical to bare metal : the functionality of the VM must be
the same as running on bare metal, modulo minor differences (e.g., the
VMM can present a VGA card, but it need not offer a virtual version
of all available hardware on the market).
2. Efficiency : A majority (“statistically dominant“ in Popek and Gold-
berg’s terminology) of instructions must be executed directly on the
physical CPU. This is the main differentiator from emulation, which
has the additional translation steps.
3. Resource control : The VMM must maintain control of the physical
computing resources at all times: VMs have full hardware access while
running, but the VMM is able to override VM operations (e.g., by
preempting the VM’s execution). This property has important impli-
cations that will be useful for reliability and security monitoring.
After presenting the above characteristics of virtualized systems, Popek
and Goldberg proposed the “trap-and-emulate” method for implementing
a VMM. In trap-and-emulate, the VM’s instructions are executed natively
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on the host CPU until a privileged operation is needed. Upon reaching a
privileged operation, the execution of the VM traps to the VMM where it
emulates the necessary functionality (e.g., updating page tables or performing
disk output). Once the VMM is finished emulating the necessary function-
ality for a privileged operation, the VMM returns control to the VM which
continues by natively executing instructions on the host CPU.
2.3 Virtualization and x86
While systems such as IBM’s CP/CMS had hardware support for virtualiza-
tion since the s/360 in the 1960s [13], Intel’s x86 architecture did not have
hardware support for virtualization until 2007. Before hardware support
for virtualization, x86 was viewed as “unfriendly” to software based virtual-
ization. For example, one cannot directly implement the trap-and-emulate
method for x86 in software. This is due to the fact that not all privileged in-
structions executed with user privileges trap to the OS/kernel privilege level.
For example, the popf instruction that populates the EFLAGS register with
values from the top of the stack behaves differently depending on which priv-
ilege level the CPU is in:2 when the CPU is executing in kernel mode, the
CPU sets certain flags (e.g., IOPL), whereas when the system is executing in
user mode, the CPU just leaves those flags unaffected. This behavior differ-
ence across privilege levels prevents a potential VMM from running a VM in
user mode and just emulating any privileged operation when that privileged
operation traps to the host OS (the host OS would effectively be functioning
as a VMM in this case).
2.4 Hardware Assisted Virtualization in x86
Most of the techniques presented in this dissertation are built on Hardware-
Assisted Virtualization (HAV) as offered in Intel x86. HAV is an alternative
to other techniques such as paravirtualization (e.g., as used by Xen [14]) and
binary translation (e.g., as used by VMware [15]). This section provides a
2For full details, see “Operation” at http://x86.renejeschke.de/html/file_
module_x86_id_250.html
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Figure 2.3: Intel VT-x adds another set of privileged modes multiplexed
with x86 privilege levels: the VMM or hypervisor executes in Host Mode
and the VM or guest executes in Guest Mode.
brief summary of Intel’s Hardware-Assisted Virtualization (HAV) virtual ma-
chine extensions (VMX) to the x86 instruction set as needed to understand
the work presented throughout this dissertation; complete details are avail-
able in the Intel Software Developer’s Manual [16]. While the description
of the hardware architecture below and work presented in this dissertation
pertain to Intel VT-x, AMD’s AMD-V technology is based on essentially the
same concepts and details can be found in AMD’s Architecture Programmer’s
Manual [17].
Intel’s HAV implementation extends the x86 ISA with Virtual Machine
eXtensions (VMX) that allow for one to develop a “trap-and-emulate” VM-
M/hypervisor as described in the previous section. All major operating sys-
tems executing on the x86 platform run in protected mode, and effectively
use two privilege levels: ring 0 (“system mode”) and ring 3 (“user mode”).
Similarly, Intel VT-x uses two modes of operation: root mode and non-root
mode, which are layered on top of rings 0 and 3. The hypervisor executes in
root mode and the virtual machines (VMs) execute in non-root mode (often
referred to as guest mode). The hypervisor runs a virtual machine (VM)
by invoking a VM Entry (via the vmlaunch instruction). When the VM is
executing in non-root mode and certain operations are performed (e.g., a
privileged instruction is executed), control is transferred to the hypervisor
(the CPU transitions to root mode) via a VM Exit event. The transitions
between root and non-root mode via the VM Entry/Exit mechanism are il-
lustrated in Fig. 2.3. The VM Exit mechanism allows a guest mode OS to
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run in privilege ring 0 and is an implementation of the “trap-and-emulate”
style of virtualization [10]. A hypercall is a request (similar to a system call
in an OS) that can be issued by a VM so that the hypervisor can perform an
operation on its behalf. In Intel VT-x, the vmcall instruction is used to issue
hypercall. In addition to instructions and VM Exit events, VT-x introduced
the Virtual Machine Control Structure (VMCS), a 4KiB structure that is
used to manage each virtual CPU (vCPU) of a VM. The VMCS contains
information such as the register guest and host register state and is used to
both configure a guest’s vCPU as well as store the host state to be restored
upon a VM Exit (e.g., the host’s register values).
In addition to virtualizing the CPU, a VMM/hypervisor also needs to vir-
tualize the memory management subsystem. The x86 Memory Management
Unit (MMU)’s main task is to provide virtual to physical address translation
through the use of paging. The MMU automatically walks page table struc-
tures managed by the OS kernel. The kernel maintains page tables to give
user processes a virtual address space. This virtual address space is defined
by the set of page tables located at the current page directory base address
(which is obtained from the CR3 register). In a virtualized system there are
four different types of addresses: the guest virtual address (GVA) - a virtual
address provided by the guest operating system; the guest physical address
(GPA) - the physical address of the virtual memory that the guest sees and
is allocated by the host; the host virtual address (HVA) - a virtual address
allocated by the host OS; and finally the host physical address (HPA) - the
address of physical memory used by the hardware.
Just as with x86 CPUs, the x86 MMU is not virtualized: there is only
one MMU for the system and it cannot be partitioned for multiple OSs. In
order to maintain the resource control requirement for virtualized systems,
one cannot give the guest OS control of the MMU since it cannot be shared.
Therefore, in the first implementations of x86 HAV, guest page faults would
cause VM Exits and the hypervisor would manage translations via shadow
page table structures in the hypervisor. However, adding a VM Exit to the
page fault handling path decreases memory performance. To reduce the num-
ber of VM Exits, two-dimensional paging (TDP) allows VMs to manage their
own page tables (GVA to GPA translations) directly. Intel’s TDP is called
Extended Page Tables (EPT). With EPT, the hardware traverses an addi-
tional set of page tables managed by the hypervisor to translate from GPAs
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Figure 2.4: Translating a Guest Virtual Address (GVA) using Intel’s
Extended Page Tables (EPT). The Guest OS page tables (shown as a
two-level structure) translate from guest virtual to guest physical, which is
then translated to host physical by the EPTs (shown as a four-level
structure).
to HPAs. Since the hypervisor generally operates with kernel privileges and
can manage the physical address space, the HVA→GVA translation is not
needed and would introduce unnecessary overhead. Since the guest OS can
directly manage its own page tables and update CR3, EPT reduces the number
of VM Exits due to page faults. However, in EPT, the hardware traverses
two sets of page tables to translate a GVA: the guest page tables (stored
in the VM’s address space) are walked to translate from guest virtual to
host physical address, and then the EPTs (stored in the hypervisor’s address
space) are walked to translate from guest physical to host physical address.
This set of translations and the various paging structures are illustrated in
Fig. 2.4. Note that while in EPT page faults are less expensive, Translation-
Lookaside-Buffer (TLB) misses become much more expensive since additional
page tables need to be traversed [18]. In the worst case with a 64-bit guest
on a 64-bit host (64-bit page tables are 4 levels), a TLB miss with EPT will
result in 20 memory accesses to translate a single GVA: 5 memory accesses
are needed to translate each of the 4 levels in the guest page tables (4 ac-
cesses to EPT Entries to translate the guest page table entry + 1 access
for reading the guest page table entry itself). Similar to Page Table Entries
(PTEs), EPT Entries (EPTEs) describe a page and contain information like
the address of the page and also control bit (e.g., for permissions). If an
EPTE does not exist for a GPA or if the permissions for that guest physical
page would be violated by a memory access, the CPU will VM Exit with an
EPT VIOLATION, which is analogous to a page fault for a normal OS.
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Figure 2.5: Typical KVM architecture: KVM itself is a module that can be
loaded into the Linux kernel at runtime and a Virtual Machine is treated as
a separate user process that usually utilizes QEMU for device emulation.
2.5 Kernel-based Virtual Machine
To meet community demand for a standard open-source hypervisor, the
Linux community developed a hypervisor integrated directly in the Linux
kernel. This hypervisor, called Kernel-based Virtual Machine or KVM [19],
supports both Intel and AMD HAV. KVM is a standalone module for the
Linux kernel and is often integrated with QEMU as shown in Fig. 2.5.
When using KVM, a VM is treated as a user process. In the most com-
mon use case, it is more accurate to refer to the hypervisor as qemu-kvm
since the actual userspace program running inside the host OS is the same
QEMU program that was described in Section 2.1. Both KVM and QEMU
perform duties that are typically expected of a hypervisor, performing differ-
ent types of emulation for trap-and-emulate virtualization. A VM is started
with a QEMU process that performs all hardware emulation (e.g., sets up vir-
tual hardware devices and runs a virtual BIOS or EFI). Once initial setup is
complete, QEMU transfers control of the VM to KVM. Instead of translating
instructions through the TCG as exemplified in Fig. 2.1, however, instruc-
tions are executed natively on the CPU through KVM’s use of HAV. KVM
follows the UNIX “everything is a file” philosophy and to use HAV instead
of dynamic translation, QEMU communicates with KVM by issuing ioctl
system calls on a special /dev/kvm device [20]. Each vCPU is treated as an
open file and QEMU manages each vCPU through a file descriptor. After
starting a vCPU with the KVM RUN ioctl, KVM will issue a VM Entry and
handle VM Exits pertaining to privileged OS-level emulation tasks (e.g., for
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managing control register access and EPT violations). In some cases, such
as for virtual devices such as an emulated disk drive, KVM cannot handle a
VM Exit and KVM will forward those exits to QEMU by returning from the
KVM RUN ioctl. QEMU will then perform the necessary emulation task (e.g.,
write data to the disk) and reissue the KVM RUN when it is ready to continue
executing the VM using HAV. For a performance comparison of different
hypervisor technologies including KVM, please see Appendix A.
Since KVM is a Linux kernel component and QEMU is an emulation pro-
gram, both KVM and QEMU have a large number of configuration options
that make it difficult to configure and manage VMs manually using those two
components. Typically, system administrators use a management layer like
libvirt to abstract away these details [21]. Libvirt provides an XML-based
configuration interface that allows one to manage multiple hypervisors (e.g.,
Xen and KVM) using the same format and control interface.
2.6 Cloud Computing
An important use case of virtualization has been as the key building block
of cloud computing systems. The most generally accepted definition for
cloud computing was published by the US National Institute of Standards
and Technology (NIST) in 2011 [22]. According to the NIST definition, the
essential characteristics of a cloud service are:
• On-demand self-service: The user can automatically request capabili-
ties from the provider.
• Broad network access: All systems must be accessible through the net-
work.
• Resource pooling: Users benefit from large resource pools owned by
the provider. The provider benefits by having maximum utilization of
their systems.
• Rapid elasticity: Scale can be adjusted rapidly up and down to meet
current demand.
• Measured service: Resources are provided in a utility model; both the
user and the provider can monitor and control resource usage.
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In addition to the above cloud characteristics, NIST also defined multiple
cloud service models which have been widely accepted by industry. This
dissertation considers the Infrastructure as a Service (IaaS) model (e.g., as
offered by Amazon EC2). In practice, other cloud abstractions (e.g., Software
as a Service/SaaS and Platform as a Service/PaaS) are often built upon IaaS.
In IaaS, users rent computing resources from a cloud provider. The rented
resources come in the form of compute, networking, and/or storage. At the
base of these resources is compute, which is typically delivered in the form
of Virtual Machines that the customer runs on top of the cloud provider’s
physical hardware. A key advantage of using IaaS as opposed to other cloud
models is that the user has complete control over their environment. If an
organization is migrating from their own data center to a cloud, IaaS offers
the least disruptive migration path since other cloud models (e.g., PaaS)
require one to redevelop an application for a new interface. When renting
VMs from an IaaS cloud provider, users upload an image to the provider’s
platform or create it directly on that platform. If the cloud provider uses a
standard format for VM images (e.g., the one preferred by open source tools
such as QEMU), IaaS can also be viewed as a vendor-neutral solution.
Cloud computing environments can either be offered as public or private
clouds. A public cloud is the typical cloud environment where one rents re-
sources from a cloud service provider such as Amazon or Microsoft. A private
cloud is one run by an organization for internal use, often with the intention
of sharing development resources across multiple groups. A hybrid cloud is
a combination of a public and a private cloud, where an organization uses
a private cloud that connects to a public cloud should the local computing
resources be exhausted.
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Chapter 3
Hypervisor-based Reliability and Security
Monitoring
3.1 The Hypervisor as Part of the Trusted Computing
Base
The virtualization characteristics defined by Popek and Goldberg and pre-
sented in Section 2.2 allow one to develop robust reliability and security
monitoring. In particular, the resource control requirement allows one to
place a monitor at the level of the hypervisor/VMM that inspects the behav-
ior of a potentially untrusted VM. Note that when performing hypervisor-
based VM monitoring, the Trusted Computing Base (TCB) includes not
only the hardware, but also the hypervisor. A high-level diagram explaining
hypervisor-based monitoring is illustrated in Fig. 3.1.
Integrating the hypervisor into the TCB does mean, however, that VM
monitoring is vulnerable to VM Escape and similar attacks [23]. A VM Es-
cape attack is an attack where a VM breaks out of its isolated environment
and affects either the hypervisor or a neighboring VM. However, in practice
these attacks are rare (but notable, e.g., VENOM [24]), but addressing and
Untrusted VM 
Hypervisor 
STRONG ISOLATION 
i  + Monitoring 
Hardware 
Figure 3.1: Illustration of Hypervisor-based Monitoring. One adds
monitoring functionality to the hypervisor to take advantage of the strong
isolation between the hypervisor and a potentially untrusted VM.
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preventing them is an open research question. Most hypervisor vulnerabili-
ties, however, do not occur in the actual HAV layer (e.g., KVM), but inside
the device emulation components that are often implemented as privileged
userspace applications (e.g., QEMU in the qemu-kvm configuration). For
example, VENOM was a vulnerability in a virtual floppy device that was en-
abled by default in hypervisors that used QEMU for device emulation (e.g.,
KVM, Xen, and VirtualBox). One can mitigate against this risk by ensuring
that only a minimal set of devices are loaded for a running VM as demon-
strated by Nguyen et. al. in Delusional Boot [25]. However, this technique is
not foolproof as other vulnerabilities may exist. Since a hypervisor is gener-
ally a small and well-defined codebase, it is amenable to a variety of integrity
techniques [26–31].
In an IaaS cloud environment, one can expect a cloud provider to have
a homogeneous data center, which an ideal environment for integrity veri-
fication techniques. It is not possible to make a similar claim for customer
VMs based on homogeneity: clouds by their very nature have a highly var-
ied workload across the entire customer base. This makes a technique like
hypervisor-based monitoring particularly attractive: since the monitors are
developed and sit at an abstraction layer below the customer’s VM it is possi-
ble to reuse the same monitoring functionality across varying customer guest
OSs and workloads.
3.2 Virtual Machine Introspection
The first hypervisor-based monitoring technique, virtual machine introspec-
tion (VMI), was introduced by Garfinkel and Rosenblum 2003 [3] and has
been utilized for many purposes such as malware detection [32], building hon-
eypots [33] and performing integrity checks on guest OS data structures [34].
VMI was presented as an intrusion detection method based on the VMware
hypervisor. In their IDS work, Garfinkel and Rosenblum extracted OS prop-
erties using Linux’s crash dump analysis techniques on the kernel memory
image and then used this information to check for policy violations inside the
guest OS. The main technique of VMI is to extract guest OS-level properties
from the memory image of a running VM. Currently, the most popular VMI
framework is the open source LibVMI framework [35]. However, to take low-
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level information available to the hypervisor and perform actionable moni-
toring, VMI requires semantic information about the guest OS (e.g., kernel
data structure addresses and offsets). The inability of the hypervisor to un-
derstand guest OS semantics without additional information about the guest
is often referred to as the semantic gap in the literature.
In order to address the semantic gap, LibVMI creates a view of the guest
OS by parsing the guest OS data structures by running code inside the guest
OS (e.g., loading a kernel module that calculates kernel data structure ad-
dresses and offsets). After gathering those offsets, LibVMI obtains moni-
toring information of interest from the running VM (e.g., the list of current
processes). In a homogeneous cloud environment, one would like to perform
introspection automatically and without requiring one to compile and load
special programs (e.g., kernel modules) inside the guest. To address the se-
mantic gap in a more automated fashion, Virtuoso [36] and VMST [37] run
standard UNIX utilities, such as ps or lsmod inside of a running VM. VMST
runs the binary of interest on a clone of the guest in a trusted VM while redi-
recting kernel memory reads to the untrusted guest. All of libVMI, Virtuoso,
and VMST require the provider to run code inside the user’s VM (either a
kernel module or application). A contribution of this dissertation is a means
by which one can address the semantic gap without forcing the VM to run
specialized code (see Chapter 6 for more details).
At the time of writing, LibVMI has been expanded beyond its traditional
memory analysis to include support for hardware events and memory foren-
sics [38]. LibVMI does support hook-based monitoring that is based on page
permissions (e.g., using EPT with KVM on Intel).
3.3 Event-Based vs. Polling Monitoring
Broadly speaking, security monitoring can be decomposed into two steps:
logging and auditing [39]. Logging is the act of recording data about a system
and auditing is the processing of the logged data. A detector is a monitor
where the logging and auditing phases are combined into one component: an
action is observed and the decision is made immediately afterwards.
The logging phase of monitoring can be performed with two different
schemes: polling and event-based. Polling-based monitoring is the tradi-
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tional form of security monitoring: one periodically inspects the state of the
system to log its activity (e.g., checking the list of running processes every 60
seconds). Event-based monitoring is similar to interrupt-driven I/O: an event
is generated by a behavior in the system and logged. Event-based systems
have an advantage over polling systems: in an event-based system any time
an event occurs, the logger is notified because the logger subscribes to that
event. Since the event is triggered upon the behavior of interest, it is possible
to respond to the behavior immediately. Using this immediate response, by
triggering on particular events we can potentially preempt attacks. This is
contrasted with polling where an event may be detected after the fact.
In addition to concerns about responsiveness, polling-based systems present
another issue: they are vulnerable to transient attacks. A transient attack is
an attack that occurs between logging intervals in a polling-based monitoring
system. To successfully execute a transient attack, an attacker must be able
to launch an entire attack that is either shorter than the monitoring interval
or can be decomposed into discrete stages (e.g., breaking apart a sensitive file
and sending it over the network). Many polling monitors work by inspecting
data structures inside a system (e.g., the list of running processes). The run-
time of these monitors is therefore dependent on the amount of time it takes
to inspect those data structures (both in the logging and auditing phase).
If an attacker is aware of the monitoring systems in use, then that attacker
can artificially increase the amount of work for the monitoring system to
perform by spamming the system with fake data (e.g., spawning processes
that perform no useful work). This spamming attack, along with a transient
attack, is illustrated in Fig. 3.2.
When conducting a transient attack, it is important to understand the
state of the monitoring system. That is, an attacker would like to know
when logging is started so as to maximize his or her chance of success. In
the case of an in-OS monitor, an attacker could determine that monitor runs
by inspecting the list of processes and seeing when the monitor enters the
runnable state and then calculating the monitoring interval [8,40]. However,
an advantage of hypervisor-based monitoring systems is the strong isolation
of the monitoring system from the guest OS: it is not possible for a poten-
tial attacker to directly observe that a hypervisor-based monitor is running.
Hypervisor-based monitoring systems that conduct polling can be especially
vulnerable to transient attacks since the monitoring interval can be relatively
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Figure 3.2: Illustration of transient and spamming attacks. A transient
attack (top): the attacker launches an attack when a polling-based monitor
is not logging and finishes the attack before the start of the next monitoring
interval. A spamming attack (bottom): the attacker causes an attack to go
undetected by creating extra work for both the logger and auditor,
increasing the vulnerable window. Note that in this example, the attack
actually occurs during the auditing phase, which is still vulnerable because
the example monitor has serialized logging and auditing. © 2014 IEEE
long. This is especially the case if memory is inspected as with libVMI (e.g.,
5 ms). This long inspection opens up hypervisor-based monitoring systems to
timing-based side channels. In particular, we investigated the impact of the
VM suspend timing side channel [41] that is caused when a hypervisor-based
monitor paused a VM during monitoring. This side channel is illustrated
in Fig. 3.3. Various techniques exist to mitigate the risk to a polling-based
monitor from a timing side channel (e.g., virtual clocks [42] and randomized
monitoring intervals), but these are most effective only against long attacks.
Polling-based systems are fundamentally vulnerable to transient attacks and
as such we chose to develop event-based loggers.
3.4 Hardware-based Techniques
In order to take advantage of virtualization’s potential for monitoring, one
can utilize events from HAV (i.e., VM Exits) to provide monitoring. Since
VM Exits are guaranteed to occur for particular events by the hardware,
they provide a robust mechanism for generating events that cannot be cir-
cumvented by actions inside the guest OS. Since VM Exits are tied to privi-
leged operations that need to be emulated when the guest OS is performing
certain operations, VM Exits offer insight into the behavior of the guest OS.
Past work has demonstrated how hardware architectural state can be used to
interpret a guest OS’s operations [6, 43, 44]. In particular, Antfarm [43] and
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Figure 3.3: A diagram of how an attacker can measure the monitoring
interval of a polling-based VM monitoring system in order to perform a
transient attack. This figure was originally published by the USENIX
Association WOOT’15 [41].
its extension Lycosid [6] use CR3 to count the number of guest user processes.
Since CR3 points to the active page tables for a process and each process must
have its own virtual memory address space, each separate user process has
its own CR3 register. In pre-EPT configurations, Intel VT-x would generate
a CR ACCESS VM Exit event each time the guest OS overwrites the CR3 value
(this VM Exit tells the hypervisor to change shadow page tables). The first
work published with this technique was Antfarm, and the authors used VM
Exit-based process tracking to build a hypervisor assisted anticipatory disk
scheduler.
The same authors from Antfarm then extended the process counting idea
to detect hidden process-level rootkits in Lycosid [6]. As part of a longer
term attack, an attacker would often like to hide a process he or she has cre-
ated (e.g., a keylogger). Many of these rootkits that hide processes will use
techniques like Direct Kernel Object Manipulation (DKOM) that will manip-
ulate the kernel data structures to hide the process from OS-level monitoring.
Since VMI-based detection techniques involve traversing OS data structures
from the hypervisor, these techniques would also fail to detect DKOM-based
attacks (e.g., libVMI will also not see a process hidden from the task list).
However, if the hidden process runs, it will still likely have its own set of
page tables. Therefore, even if a process is removed from OS data structures
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it will still cause a VM Exit when its CR3 value is loaded. This VM Exit
behavior allows us to construct a hypervisor-level view of the processes in a
system. That hypervisor-level view can be compared with the OS-level view
of the system and any inconsistencies can be indicators of a hidden rootkit.
It is important to note that the use of a unique set of page tables for each
process is common across not only OSs that use x86 but other architectures.
This OS behavior is invariant during correct operation of the system and is
an example of a hardware architectural invariant since it is an OS invariant
that is reflected in the hardware state. Our work in HyperTap defined the
concept of hardware architectural invariants and provided examples of VM
Exit-based detectors that have their root of trust in hardware architectural
invariants [8]. In addition to developing (and testing on both Linux and
Windows) a hidden rootkit detector similar to the one presented in Lycosid,
we presented an OS hang detector based on CR ACCESS VM Exits. OS hang
detection through monitoring CR3 writes is possible since during normal ex-
ecution an OS will regularly be changing processes. Even if the system is in
an idle state, one will still see system processes (e.g., init, watchdog, sshd)
being scheduled. When one no longer sees CR3 writes, processes are not being
scheduled and the guest OS is hanging. Guest OS hang detection and hid-
den rootkit detection demonstrate the same hardware architectural invariant:
that a process change is reflected by a CR3 write can be used for both reli-
ability and security monitoring. However, hardware architectural invariants
have much broader use than just process counting and examples of other uses
for reliability and security monitoring are tabulated in Table 3.1.
SecVisor is a small hypervisor built on Xen that protects the integrity of
an underlying guest OS by ensuring not only kernel code integrity, but also
by protecting core hardware data structures like the LDT and GDT [45].
Unlike a traditional hypervisor that is meant to manage multiple guest OSs,
SecVisor is intended to protect a single guest OS using AMD’s AMD-V vir-
tualization technology. Since it is based on the AMD architecture, SecVisor
uses the functionally equivalent Nested Page Tables (NPT) instead of Intel
EPT to create separate isolated address spaces for kernel and userspace ex-
ecution. In these address spaces, certain actions across address spaces are
restricted (e.g., user code cannot be executed when executing in kernel space
and kernel code cannot be executed when executing in user space). In order
to learn about guest OS semantics, SecVisor requires a user to modify the
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Table 3.1: Hardware Architectural Invariants from HyperTap © 2014 IEEE
Monitoring
Category
Guest event Related VM
Exit
Architectural Invariant
Context switch
Process context
switch
CR ACCESS The CR3 register always points to
the PDBA of the running process
Writes to CR registers cause
CR ACCESS VM Exits
Thread switch EPT VIOLATION The TR register always points to TSS
structure of the running process
TSS.RSP0 is unique for each thread
Interrupt-based
system call
EXCEPTION Software interrupts cause
EXCEPTION VM Exits
Fast system call WRMSR SYSENTER’s target instruction is
stored in an MSR registerSystem call
EPT VIOLATION Write to MSR registers causes
WRMSR VM Exit
I/O Access
Programmed I/O IO INST Execution of I/O instructions (e.g.
IN, INS, OUT, OUTS)
Memory mapped
I/O
EPT VIOLATION Access to Memory Mapped I/O ar-
eas, which are set protected
Hardware inter-
rupt
EXTERNAL INT Hardware interrupt delivery causes
EXTERNAL INT VM Exits
I/O APIC Access APIC ACCESS I/O Advance Programmable Inter-
rupt Controller (APIC) events
Memory Access EPT VIOLATION Accesses to memory regions
with proper permissions cause
EPT VIOLATION VM Exits
Low-level
Instruction Exe-
cution
EPT VIOLATION Execution of instructions from
non-executable regions causes
EPT VIOLATION VM Exits
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guest kernel code by adding hypercalls that inform the hypervisor of cer-
tain guest OS operations. Intel has recently open-sourced a project similar
to SecVisor called kernel guard (abbreviated iKGT for “Intel Kernel Guard
Technology”) [46]. Like SecVisor, iKGT is intended to protect a single un-
derlying guest OS. iKGT is intended as a policy enforcement framework and
example policies also have features like process counting used by Lycosid and
HyperTap.
As an alternative to using VT-x features for creating an isolated monitor-
ing environment, SPECTRE uses Intel’s System Management Mode (SMM)
to protect the OS [47]. SMM is a special privileged mode of Intel CPUs that
executes independently of the OS. SMM is often invoked using System Man-
agement Interrupts (SMIs), which are used by hardware vendors to perform
OS independent functions (such as advanced power management function-
ality and memory prefailure monitoring [48]). SMIs can be invoked by the
hardware and SMI handlers are completely isolated from the OS. SPECTRE
is implemented as a set of SMI handlers that perform integrity checks on
OS data structures. However, since SMIs are completely decoupled from OS
execution and are executed periodically by the hardware, SMM-based tech-
niques are vulnerable to transient attacks. Furthermore, SMM is difficult
to work with and is not easily adapted: code used in SMM must be loaded
by the BIOS at boot time and can conflict with existing vendor firmware
(most enterprise IT environments would not want to void vendor warranties
by overwriting BIOS). In the case of SPECTRE, the authors loaded a cus-
tom BIOS based on Coreboot [49]. Transitions into SMM are expensive
and avoiding this performance cost limits what can be done [50]. Similar to
detecting polling-based VMI monitoring, work has been performed by the
low-latency community to detect unwanted vendor SMIs [51].
3.5 Hook-based Techniques
In order to provide as-a-service functionality, we require a monitoring sys-
tem that can be enabled/disabled without disrupting the VM (to adapt the
monitoring as user demands change) and that allows for monitoring of arbi-
trary operations (to allow any type of functionality to be developed on top of
the monitoring system). Hook-based monitoring satisfies those requirements.
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Hook-based monitoring works by replacing a part of the monitoring target’s
(e.g., a VM) execution with a hook (e.g., by overwriting a statement with
a function call). When the hook is executed, control is transferred to the
monitoring system. In a hypervisor-based hook monitoring system, the VM
transfers control to the hypervisor when a hook inside the VM is executed.
This is similar in operation to a debugger that briefly pauses a program to in-
spect its state. The research community has produced a variety of techniques
for hook-based VM monitoring [5, 7, 52,53].
An illustration of a hook-based monitoring system adapted from the formal
model presented in Lares [5] is shown in Fig. 3.4. In the case of hypervisor-
based VM monitoring, the target is a virtual machine and the monitor can
run in either the hypervisor [4, 53], in a separate security VM [5], or in the
same VM [7]. Regardless of the monitor’s location, one must ensure that
the monitor is resilient to tampering by the target VM in order to maintain
the resource control requirement of virtualization. The monitor also must
have access to all relevant state of the target VM needed to perform its
monitoring function (e.g., virtual device information, guest memory). In
order to support a wide range of monitoring, a VM monitoring system should
be able to hook the execution of any instruction, be it in the guest OS or in
an application. When looking at previous hook-based VM monitoring work,
of particular note are the Lares [5] and SIM [7] approaches. Lares uses a
memory-protected trampoline inserted by a driver in the guest VM. That
trampoline issues a hypercall to notify a separate security VM that an event
of interest has occurred. This approach requires modification to the guest
OS (albeit in a trusted manner), so runtime adding and removing of hooks
is not possible. Furthermore, a guest OS driver and trampoline is needed for
every OS and version of OS supported by the monitoring infrastructure. The
Secure In-VM Monitoring (SIM) approach uses a clever configuration of HAV
by introducing entry and exit gates into a separate address space within the
target VM. This in-VM approach prevents VM Exits for monitoring events
and switches to a protected page inside the VM that performs monitoring.
Since SIM does not incur VM Exits, it achieves low overhead. However,
the additions of special entry and exit gates to the guest OS modify OS
functionality at compile time. Hooks are also placed in specific predefined
kernel locations, reducing adaptability.
In contrast to both the Lares and SIM approaches, hprobes (which are the
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Figure 3.4: Hook-based monitoring. A hook triggers based on event e and
control is transferred to the monitor through notification N . The monitor
processes e with a behavior B and returns control to the target with a
response R. In the case of hypervisor-based VM monitoring, the target is a
VM and the monitor runs in the hypervisor. © 2015 IEEE
subject of Chapter 4) do not require any modification of the guest OS and
can be added at runtime to arbitrary locations inside guests [53]. Note that
no past work on hook-based VM monitoring mentions the removal of hooks,
functionality that is necessary for an as-a-service approach and supported by
the hprobe framework. While most research has been performed on platforms
built on top of open-source technology, similar dynamic monitoring solutions
also exist in proprietary systems. For example, VMware ESXi [52] has been
monitored to provide similar functionality in vprobes.
3.6 Emulator-based Dynamic Analysis
3.6.1 Program Analysis
Broadly speaking, dynamic program analysis, or dynamic analysis, is the
technique of analyzing a program by executing it [54]. Results from dynamic
analysis are a true representation of how the program executes since one
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executes the program during analysis. For example, the popular tool Val-
grind [55] is a dynamic analysis tool used for debugging memory issues and
also application profiling (e.g., for understanding performance characteristics
such as cache behavior).
In contrast to dynamic analysis, static analysis is the technique of analyz-
ing a program without executing it. Static analysis includes compiler-based
techniques and source code analysis. Static analysis typically considers all
possible control flow paths in a program and is commonly used for finding
bugs in source code. Tools like the LLVM frontend Clang [56] provide this
type of functionality.
Compared to dynamic analysis, static analysis techniques are typically not
sensitive to any particular input, but can take longer to complete since one
must examine multiple possible control flow paths. That said, while dynamic
analysis provides precise information about execution of a program, it can
be difficult to determine how general the results are [57].
3.6.2 Emulator-based Dynamic Analysis
An important use case for dynamic analysis tools has been malware analysis.
Malware represents some of the most complicated software as malware often
involves interactions with various aspects of a system (e.g., libraries and OS
components). Furthermore, core malware functionality often relies on the
behavior of dynamic memory management (e.g., in overflow-based attacks).
Particularly sophisticated malware will use self-modifying code, which can
be difficult for static analysis techniques to identify. While static analysis is
valuable for verifying program correctness and finding bugs, it is not as well
suited to programs that have complex system interactions, dynamic memory
effects, and code that changes at runtime.
As discussed in Section 2.1, whole-system emulation represents an entire
computing system in a software application. This software representation
of a system is an ideal platform for measuring the complex relationships be-
tween hardware and software components. As such, emulator-based dynamic
analysis tools are widely used for malware analysis [58–60]. While malware
analysis is an important motivating use-case for emulator-based dynamic
analysis, these emulator-based tools are ideal for analyzing other software
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that has system-wide interactions and dynamic runtime properties. One
class of software that also shares those properties is operating systems. As
will be discussed in Chapter 6, we will use emulator-based dynamic analysis
to supplement our VM monitoring system.
Emulator-based dynamic analysis tools are powerful and flexible, but have
two major drawbacks: performance and detectability. While QEMU is a
fast emulator, it still runs at least a factor of 4 slower than bare metal [9].
As researchers develop more tools to analyze and defeat malware, malware
authors also devise new techniques to avoid detection. Since an emulator
typically offers specific virtual devices (e.g., BIOS) and also has measurable
performance characteristics, it is fairly straightforward for an application to
detect when it is running inside an emulator. As many analysis tools are
written using emulators, sophisticated malware changes its behavior when it
detects it is running in an emulated environment. To address the performance
and detectability drawbacks of emulator-based dynamic analysis, researchers
have used features from leading CPU vendors to enhance dynamic analysis.
Since emulators are popular for dynamic analysis, it is natural to extend those
concepts to the VM Exit mechanism provided by HAV. VMMs specifically in-
tended to be used as dynamic analysis platforms have been developed [44,61].
However, HAV is limited to a small subset of events in a system and if one
wishes to have the same functionality as an emulator-based tool (e.g., to
perform instruction-level analysis), any performance benefits disappear due
to the large amount of context switching between the hypervisor and VM.
Furthermore, virtualized systems suffer from many of the same detectabil-
ity issues as emulators, though their improved performance and ability to
directly use physical devices [62] make virtualized systems less detectable
than emulated ones (e.g., KVM can present a vCPU with the same make
and model of the physical CPU, whereas QEMU will present a very basic
x86 CPU). In order to avoid detection by malware from running in either an
emulator or VMM, branch tracing features have been used to produce traces
of malware running on bare metal systems [63]. Branch tracing allows one
to develop an analysis tool that runs on information that is collected directly
from running an application on a physical CPU. However, these CPU features
offer limited functionality when compared to emulator-based techniques and
it is unclear that malware would not also be able to detect that the branch
tracing features are enabled.
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3.6.3 Dynamic Executable Code Analysis Framework
(DECAF)
In this dissertation, we use the Dynamic Executable Code Analysis Frame-
work, or DECAF, developed by the SycureLab at Syracuse University [60].1
Like other emulator-based dynamic analysis frameworks, DECAF is based on
QEMU and therefore it supports a VM image format that is compatible with
the popular Xen and KVM hypervisors. DECAF works using a simple plugin
API, has performance as a design principle, and has been demonstrated to
work with both Linux and Windows guests.
DECAF is a modified version of QEMU and starting a VM in DECAF is
just the same as using vanilla QEMU. In order to perform dynamic analysis
in DECAF, one builds a plugin that registers callbacks on certain events.
Plugins can be attached or removed from DECAF at runtime, allowing one
to change analysis functionality without needing to restart the emulated sys-
tem. Furthermore, certain callbacks can introduce significant overhead. To
demonstrate the broad functionality offered by DECAF, a list of available
callbacks at the time of writing is in Table 3.2. A key feature of DECAF
is that it injects its callbacks into the Translation Blocks (TBs) generated
by QEMU: i.e., callbacks are injected as function call TCG ops (refer to
Section 2.1 for details of QEMU implementation). Since DECAF events are
added to TBs, DECAF can be used as a cross-platform dynamic analysis tool.
Though our work focuses exclusively on x86, DECAF has been extended for
analysis of the Android OS running on ARM [64].
Note that while DECAF callbacks are invoked by function calls during TB
execution, the callbacks actually pertain to architecture specific instructions
and not TCG ops (e.g., the DECAF INSN END CB callback would only be invoked
once for int $0x80, not for every TCG op representing int $0x80 in Fig. 2.1).
1At the time of writing, DECAF is available at: https://github.com/sycurelab/
DECAF
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Table 3.2: DECAF Callbacks
Callback Name Event on which it is invoked
DECAF BLOCK BEGIN CB Called before a Translation Block (TB) exe-
cutes
DECAF BLOCK END CB Called after a TB executes
DECAF INSN BEGIN CB Called before an instruction executes
DECAF INSN END CB Called before an instruction executes
DECAF MEM READ CB Called when memory in an address range is
read
DECAF MEM WRITE CB Called when memory in an address range is
written
DECAF KEYSTROKE CB Called when a keypress event is sent to the
virtual keyboard
DECAF NIC REC CB Called when the virtual network interface card
receives a packet
DECAF NIC SEND CB Called when the virtual network interface card
sends a packet
DECAF OPCODE RANGE CB Called when an instruction with an opcode
falling within a specified range is executed
DECAF TLB EXEC CB Called when a TLB entry is added
DECAF READ TAINTMEM CB Called when tainted memory is read
DECAF WRITE TAINTMEM CB Called when tainted memory is written
DECAF VMCALL CB† Called when the vmcall hypercall instruction
is invoked
DECAF INTR CB† Called when a hardware interrupt occurs
†: callback was added a part of this disserta-
tion
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3.7 Evaluating VM Monitoring with User State
Modeling Systems
While many of the detectors that will be presented in later chapters focus on
deterministic monitoring (e.g., detecting an event that uniquely identifies and
attack or failure), VM monitoring could also be used to provide information
for IDSes [65, 66]. In this section, we seek to understand how useful VM
monitoring data is as a source of monitoring information on a real system.
In order to evaluate the potential effectiveness of VM monitoring in an IDS
setting, we use historical data and a user state modeling intrusion detection
system.
User state modeling systems are intrusion detection systems (IDSes) that
work by tracking a user’s actions inside a computing system. The system
classifies users based on their previous actions and updates its classification
as events occur in the system. For example, one can maintain a set of discrete
states for each user in the system and classify those users as one of Benign,
Suspicious, or Malicious. For our evaluation, we use the AttackTagger IDS
which implements a user state modeling system based on factor graphs [67].
AttackTagger builds a factor graph for each user as events come in from
various sources (e.g., network monitoring, host syslogs). The factor functions
are predefined to describe the relationships between the new event, previous
events, the user state, and the previous user state. Inference is then per-
formed on the factor graph (e.g., using Gibbs sampling) to determine the
most probable user state after each event. If the most probable user state at
any time is Malicious, then AttackTagger raises an alert.
3.7.1 Simulations on Historical NCSA Incident Data
In the original AttackTagger paper, anonymized data from 116 security inci-
dents occurring from 2008-2013 at the National Center for Supercomputing
Applications (NCSA) was used to evaluate the effectiveness of its inference.
The events were both manually and automatically generated from a variety
of sources including syslogs, network monitoring logs, and the incident re-
ports themselves. To test the effectiveness of VM monitoring as a source of
information for an IDS, we reran those experiments using subsets of events
that would be available from hypervisor monitoring (e.g., host based OS
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Table 3.3: AttackTagger Evaluation of Monitoring Sources
Alerts Used Hprobe Network Hprobe ∪ Network All
TPR 52.63 65.52 74.58 79.03
TNR 99.25 91.30 98.20 98.48
FPR 0.75 8.70 1.80 1.52
FNR 47.37 34.48 25.42 20.97
events that could be detected using our monitoring systems). To compare
with the existing tools currently in place, we also ran experiments with a
subset of events that could be detected using network-based IDS tools [68].
For all experiments, AttackTagger was trained on the 51 incidents observed
from 2008-2009 and tested on the 65 incidents observed from 2010-1013.
The True Positive Rate (TPR), True Negative Rate (TNR), False Positive
Rate (FPR), and False Negative Rate (FNR) from our experiences based on
different subsets of events are shown in Table 3.3.
The “All” event set comprises all 83 events used in the AttackTagger ex-
periments.2 The “Hprobe” event set in Table 3.3 contains 28 alerts that
could be generated using the hprobe VM monitoring framework (which is
described in Chapter 4). The “Network” event set shows the result of the
same data from only including the 37 events available to a network IDS,
as this is one of the more widely deployed tools by NCSA. The “Hprobe
∪ Network” is AttackTagger running with union of both the “Hprobe” and
“Network” event sets, totalling 60 events (there are 5 events that overlap in
the two sets - e.g., opening an ssh connection by running the “ssh” command
locally). We see that the information from VM monitoring does reduce the
number of detections, but still maintains a low false positive rate. While the
“HProbe” event set represents roughly one-third of the possible events, it
is still able to detect roughly half of the attacks. We attribute this to the
fact that VM monitoring is host-based and therefore VM monitoring detects
actions directly occurring on a host with high fidelity. However, many types
of attacks cannot be detected from using only host-based data and we see
that the network-based IDS provides additional information to support VM
monitoring. We see that the majority of attacks that can be detected using
AttackTagger using both the VM and network-based monitoring alerts, and
2Note that the detection rates differ slightly from those published in [67] as the event
sets in the codebase have changed since the publication of the original AttackTagger paper
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those alerts represent 60/83=72% of the alerts. We note that when subset-
ting events, we took a pessimistic approach to get a lower bound for VM
monitoring’s detection quality. Specifically, unless we have sufficient infor-
mation to suggest that an event is detectable by VM monitoring, we assume
it cannot be detected. For example, we excluded events like FTP traffic from
the “Hprobe” data set, whereas these events could be detected by VM Moni-
toring in certain cases (e.g., if a command line utility was used to initiate ftp
communication, a monitor watching the process creation system call could
potentially detect that FTP connection).
All of the experiments to generate Table 3.3 use historical data collected
using the monitoring technology available at the time and also human de-
scriptions in incident reports. For many incidents, a VM monitoring system
may have been able to provide more information than what was recorded. If
a VM monitoring system was deployed, it likely would perform better than
what is presented in these experiments. We also note, from reading inci-
dent reports, that there is a significant amount of manual inspection that
occurs in practice: when certain alerts are received, a security engineer logs
into a machine and runs various commands to gather data or add additional
monitoring software. One intention of developing an as-a-service monitoring
system is to automate this inspection and addition of monitoring. For ex-
ample, as a user transitions states from Benign to Suspicious on a system,
one could increase the number of monitors for that system. Our dynamic
monitoring system presented in Chapter 4 supports adding and removing
monitors at runtime without disrupting the system.
34
Chapter 4
Hypervisor Probes (HProbes)
4.1 Dynamic Hypervisor-Based Monitoring
Two key components of an as-a-service system are on-demand self-service
and rapid elasticity (see Section 2.6 and [22]). In order to support those
key aspects of RSaaS, a monitoring service must be able to change at run-
time. Runtime adaptability is particularly important for security detectors,
where the landscape of possible attacks and vulnerabilities can change unpre-
dictably. As new vulnerabilities and bugs surface, one will inevitably need
to account for them in their monitoring infrastructure. In this dissertation,
a dynamic monitoring system is a monitoring system that is adaptable at
runtime. Dynamic monitoring not only allows one to enable and disable
monitoring at runtime, but also to change monitoring functionality. As in-
troduced in the previous chapter, we use a hook-based monitoring system to
accomplish dynamic monitoring.
Contrasted with a dynamic monitoring solution, a static monitoring system
is one which has its monitoring functionality hard-coded. In static monitor-
ing systems, a compile time change is required to reconfigure its monitoring.
In the case of static hook-based monitoring, this reconfiguration can either
be hook locations, monitoring functionality, or both. When it is deployed, a
static monitoring system is normally customized for its environment. How-
ever, the value of a static monitoring system decreases drastically over time
unless periodic software updates are issued. Many VM monitoring solutions
use a static monitoring approach [3,5,7,8], and updates to monitoring func-
tionality require code changes to either the hypervisor or guest OS. Those
code changes would require a hypervisor reboot or a guest OS reboot in the
best case. Reconfiguration reboots result in system downtime whenever the
monitor needs to be adapted. In many production systems, this additional
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downtime is unacceptable, particularly when the schedule is unpredictable
(e.g., security vulnerabilities).
Dynamic monitors can also provide a performance improvement over stat-
ically configured monitoring: one can often monitor only an event of interest
vs. a general class of events. This is usually because static monitoring sys-
tems may overcome inflexibility by over-subscribing to events of interest.
For example, in order to monitor the underlying guest OS, one may use a
static monitoring system with a hook into the guest OS system call handler
(e.g., the system call function) and use post-processing to filter out data
on specific system calls of interest (e.g., the exec system call used to start
processes). In a dynamic monitoring solution, one could just add hooks to
the system calls of interest as needed (e.g., only hook the sys exec function
that handle the exec system call). Furthermore, it is possible to construct
dynamic detectors that change during execution (e.g., a handler for one hook
can be used to add or remove other hooks). This idea will be explored in the
context of user state modeling systems in Section 3.7
Static monitoring systems embody a subtle violation of design principles:
a monitoring target should not have its functionality tightly coupled to the
monitoring system. However, a configuration change in a static monitoring
system can disrupt the control flow of the target system (e.g., by requiring
a restart of the underlying hypervisor). One can use techniques such as
live migration to mitigate these shortcomings in a static system. However,
live migration may not be suitable in large scale environments that need to
adapt monitoring functionality quickly (e.g., to address a newly announced
vulnerability).
In line with adaptability and being loosely coupled to the target system,
a monitoring system should also be simple in its implementation. A security
solution is only valuable if it is usable. This simplicity requirement extends
not only to the implementation itself but also to the interface used to adapt
monitoring (i.e., how one connects and develops new detectors). If a system
is overly complex and difficult to extend, the value of that system is dras-
tically reduced as much effort needs to be expended to use that system. In
fact, such a system will simply not be used. DNSSEC1 and SELinux2 can
serve as instructive examples: while they provide valuable security features
1https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc2535
2https://www.nsa.gov/public info/press room/2001/se-linux.shtml
36
(i.e., authentication and access control), both of those systems were released
around the year 2000 and to this day are still disabled in many environments
(e.g., instructions for installing software on Red Hat Enterprise Linux often
start with “ensure SELinux is disabled”). In addition to increased usability
and flexibility, a simpler implementation should yield a smaller codebase and
therefore a smaller attack surface [69].
While decoupling a monitoring system from its target could impact the
adoption of such a system from an ease-of-use standpoint, there are other im-
plications for cloud environments. A key advantage of using a VM-based IaaS
cloud over another hosting service (e.g., a virtual private server or container-
based IaaS) is the ability to run a particular guest OS and have full control
over that OS. From a cloud provider’s perspective, that means that only a few
assumptions can be made about the underlying guest OS (i.e., that the guest
OS supports the host ISA). If a cloud provider wants to offer RSaaS, that
monitoring system cannot be tightly coupled to the guest OS. Using a moni-
toring system that requires guest OS modifications raises maintenance efforts
due to the number of guest OSs the provider must support. In addition, these
monitoring systems also prevent cloud providers from monitoring VMs on-
demand (support for guest OS must be enabled before monitoring can be
used). In the worst case, a cloud provider can require the users themselves
to modify their guest OS disk image. Requiring guest OS modifications also
reduces one of the main advantages of using a HAV hypervisor: the ability to
run an unmodified guest OS inside a virtualized environment. Furthermore,
it has been shown that a large number of issues in cloud-based systems occur
during system startup [70]. Requiring users to reboot the system upon every
monitoring configuration change introduces increased risk with every guest
OS or hypervisor reboot required to reconfigure those monitoring systems.
4.1.1 Design Principles
In order to satisfy the needs of a hypervisor-based monitoring system, we set
the following design principles for a dynamic VM monitoring system:
1. Protection: Monitoring should be impervious to attacks (e.g., hook
circumvention) originating from inside the VM, assuming that an at-
tacker can own the guest OS. The authors of Lares [5] outline a formal
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model with potential attacks and security requirements for a hook-
based monitoring system. Those requirements using the notation in
Fig. 3.4 from the previous chapter are: the notification N should only
be triggered on legitimate events, the state of the target should not
change during monitoring, an attacker cannot modify the behavior B
of the monitor, and the response R cannot be avoided by the target.
2. Simplicity: The monitoring system should be simple to implement
and extend. While difficult to quantify, this requirement essentially
aims to coincide with a philosophy of usable security. In order to ease
adoption and support cloud environments, it should not require any
modification of the guest OS.
3. Dynamism: The monitoring system should be at most loosely coupled
to the target: reconfiguration can be expected to affect execution time,
but it should not disrupt the control flow of the target (e.g., require
a hypervisor reboot or guest OS restart). Furthermore, it should be
possible to insert the hooks into both the target OS and its applications.
Disabling monitors should be equivalent to removing the monitors, not
merely ceasing to record logged events.
4. Performance: The monitoring system should have acceptable over-
head for use in a production system. What is considered acceptable
overhead is always application dependent.
We use these requirements as a guide to design a hook-based hypervisor
monitoring framework that we call hypervisor probes or hprobes. As discussed
in Chapter 3, the hypervisor provides a convenient interface for isolating
monitoring from attacks and failures inside a VM while maintaining full
access to the target VM’s guest OS and applications. The hprobe framework
allows one to insert and remove hooks into arbitrary locations inside the
guest’s memory (i.e., both the guest OS and user applications) at runtime
without disrupting the VM’s control flow. In the remainder of this chapter,
we discuss the implementation of the prototype and three small example
monitors. Two of the monitors implement classical fault detection techniques
and the third illustrates the use of dynamic monitoring to rapidly produce
a detector that protects against a security vulnerability. More “realistic”
hprobe examples will be discussed in the later chapters.
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Figure 4.1: The hprobe framework integrated with the KVM hypervisor.
The Event Forwarder passes valid hprobe debug events to the Hprobe
kernel agent has been added by making code changes to KVM. The Hprobe
kernel agent communicates with KVM through Helper APIs to add/remove
probes. Detectors can either be implemented as kernel modules in the Host
OS or in userspace by communicating with the kernel agent through ioctl
functions. © 2015 IEEE
4.2 Hprobe Implementation
4.2.1 Integration with KVM
The hprobe framework was inspired by the Linux kernel profiling feature
kprobes [71], which has been used for real-time system analysis [72] and serves
as the foundation for the Linux troubleshooting toolkit systemap [73]. The
operating principle behind the hprobe prototype is to use VM Exits to trap
the VM’s execution and transfer control to monitoring functionality in the
hypervisor. This implementation leverages Hardware-Assisted Virtualization
(HAV), and the prototype framework is built on the KVM hypervisor [19].
The prototype’s architecture is shown in Fig. 4.1. The modifications to KVM
itself make up the Event Forwarder, which is a set of callbacks inserted
into one of KVM’s VM Exit handlers.3 The Event Forwarder communicates
with a separate hprobe kernel agent using Helper APIs. The hprobe kernel
agent is a loadable kernel module that is the workhorse of the framework,
containing the logic for probe execution and enabling/disabling of probes.
3Specifically, the handle exception function that processes CPU exceptions such as
debugging events
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The kernel agent provides an interface to detectors (typically developed as
kernel modules) for adding and removing probes. This interface is accessible
by kernel modules through a kernel API in the host OS (as explained in
Fig. 2.5 the host OS in this case also functions as a hypervisor since KVM
itself is a kernel module) or by user programs via an ioctl interface.
The handling of hprobe execution by a detector is illustrated in Figs. 4.2
and 4.3. A probe is added by rewriting the instruction in memory at the tar-
get address with int3, saving the original instruction, and adding the target
address to a doubly linked list of active probes. This process happens at run-
time and requires no application or guest OS restart. We reconfigure KVM
so that the int3 instruction generates an exception when executed. Once
int3 generates a VM Exit event, the hypervisor intervenes (Step 1). The hy-
pervisor uses the Event Forwarder to pass the exception to the hprobe kernel
agent, which traverses the list of active probes and verifies that the int3 was
generated by an hprobe. If the exception was generated by an hprobe, the
hprobe kernel agent reports the event and optionally calls an hprobe handler
function that can be associated with the probe. If the exception does not
belong to an hprobe (e.g., it was generated by running gdb or kprobes inside
the VM), the int3 is passed back to KVM to be forwarded to the guest OS
and handled as usual. Each hprobe handler performs a user-defined monitor-
ing function and runs in the Host OS. When the handler returns (if desired, a
deferred work mechanism can also be used to support non-blocking probes),
the hypervisor replaces the int3 instruction with the original opcode and
places the CPU in single-step mode. Once the original instruction executes,
a single-step (#DB) exception is generated, causing another VM Exit event
(Step 2). At this point, the hprobe kernel agent rewrites the int3, performs
a VM Entry, and the VM resumes its execution (Step 3). This single-step
and instruction rewrite process ensures that no probe events are missed (i.e.,
the hypervisor control the VM during probe handling). If one wishes to pro-
tect hprobes from being overwritten by the guest, the page containing the
probe can be write-protected using TDP (e.g., EPT or NPT). Similarly, if
one wanted to hide the int3 opcode from casual inspection, a similar pro-
cedure can be used by read protecting the page and replacing the int3 with
the original instruction (note that this would still leave a timing side channel
open that may detect the presence of the probe). Although this prototype
was implemented using KVM, the basic concept extends to any hypervisor
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Figure 4.2: A probe hit in the hprobe prototype. Right-facing arrows are
VM Exits and left-facing arrows are VM Entries. When int3 is executed,
the hypervisor takes control. The hypervisor optionally executes a probe
handler (probefunc()) and places the CPU into single-step mode. It then
executes the original instruction and does a VM Entry to resume the VM.
After the guest executes the original instruction, it traps back into the
hypervisor and the hypervisor will write the int3 before allowing the VM
to continue as usual. © 2015 IEEE
that can trap on similar exceptions. Note that instead of int3, we could
use any other instruction that generates VM Exits (e.g., hypercall, illegal
instruction). We chose int3 since it is well supported and has a single-byte
opcode.4
4.2.2 Sample API
In accordance with the simplicity requirement, the API for building detectors
using the hprobe framework is simple. The C API for adding and removing
probes detectors is shown below:
4A single-byte opcode is desired to avoid edge cases such as when the target instruction
is the last byte on a boundary. If a multi-byte opcode were used one could overwrite
a single-byte instruction with multiple bytes, which is only acceptable when those two
instructions are guaranteed to be executed in sequence.
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...
pushl %eax
incl %eax
decl %ebx
...
Original
...
pushl %eax
int3
decl %ebx
...
Step 1
...
pushl %eax
incl %eax
decl %ebx
...
Step 2
...
pushl %eax
int3
decl %ebx
...
Step 3
Figure 4.3: Assembly pseudocode demonstrating what an hprobe looks like
in the VM’s memory before adding a probe (left frame) and during a probe
hit (right three frames). The dashed box indicates the VM’s current
instruction being executed and the red text highlights the probe target as it
is overwritten and rewritten. © 2015 IEEE
int HPROBE_add_probe(addr_info virt_addr , vmid ,
(*) probe_func(probe_arg *arg));
int HPROBE_remove_probe(addr_info virt_addr , vmid);
The addr info structure contains the guest virtual address of the probe lo-
cation as well as the CR3 address for user space probes (described in the next
subsection), vmid is a unique identifier for the target VM (we currently use the
process id or pid of the qemu-kvm process for the target VM), and probe func
is a function pointer to the (optional) probe handler that has an argument
for a structure that contains the vCPU state and other information (e.g.,
probe address) needed by the handler function. Note that probe func func-
tions are executed in a manner that is safe against manipulation of hprobe
state, meaning that one can add and remove probes (including the owner
of the currently executing probe func) as a part of handling a probe hit -
functionality that will be useful for dynamic monitoring capabilities.
4.2.3 Building Detectors
As mentioned in the previous section, hprobes can be controlled via an ioctl
interface or a kernel API. Both interfaces distinguish between probes that are
inserted into guest kernelspace and guest userspace. That is because while
the OS always maps the kernelspace pages at the same address for all virtual
address spaces, each user program has its own virtual address space and
therefore its own set of page tables. User space probes require the Page
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Directory Base Address (from the CR3 register) to translate a guest virtual
address (GVA) into a guest physical address (GPA). Once the GPA is known,
we can overwrite the instruction at that address and insert probes into the
address space of a particular process. However, as discussed in Chapter 2, the
mapping of an OS-level construct like a running process to hardware paging
structures is not readily available from the hypervisor due to the semantic
gap between the VM and the hypervisor. In this chapter, we use libVMI
to obtain the value of the CR3 register corresponding to the target process’s
virtual address space [35]. This allows us to translate the virtual address of a
probe location (which can be obtained from dynamic or static analysis, (e.g.,
disassembling the application binary or inspecting the application’s symbol
table) to a GPA that can be used to add a probe.
If one wishes to add a probe to a userspace application, however, there
exists another challenge beyond locating the corresponding CR3 pointing to
the virtual address space belonging to the running process of the applica-
tion. Unlike the guest OS, the code pages of a running application are not
guaranteed to be resident in memory during the lifetime of the application.
Essentially, some of the application’s code may reside on disk because it ei-
ther has not been loaded or has been swapped out. When execution reaches
a page that exists but is not resident, a page fault will occur and the OS
will bring that page into memory. However, this means that the hypervisor
may not be able to insert probes directly into all locations of the program
at all times (i.e., without an existing translation for a page the host cannot
write to that particular GVA in memory). This situation arises particularly
during application startup. After loading an application, the OS uses a de-
mand paging mechanism in which the pages belonging to the application
reside on disk until the application attempts to access one of those pages.
Therefore, if the page containing the intended target location for a probe
has not yet been accessed, a translation for guest physical address to guest
virtual address will not exist. In order to support probes for user programs,
this situation must be resolved so that the hprobe framework can guarantee
that once a probe has been added through the APIs, it will always get called
on the next invocation of the instruction at the probe’s desired location -
even when an hprobe is added before the application accesses the intended
probe’s location.
One approach to solving the problem of the target guest code page residing
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on disk is to wait until the OS naturally brings the necessary page into
memory (i.e., the guest OS handles a page fault for that page). As mentioned
in Section 2.4, recent versions of x86 Hardware Assisted Virtualization (HAV)
use two-dimensional page tables. With TDP, a VM Exit does not occur for
all guest OS page table updates. However, it is possible to trap a guest
OS page table update using TDP. With Intel’s EPT, one can remove access
permissions (EPT supports read, write, and fetch/execute permissions) from
EPT entries to induce an EPT VIOLATION VM Exit event when those pages
are accessed. To detect guest OS page table updates, we remove EPT write
permissions in the EPT entry corresponding to the guest physical page that
represents the guest page table entry that holds the translation for the
guest virtual page containing the intended probe’s virtual address. At the
time of making this EPT change the guest physical page for the desired
probe location is not yet present in the guest OS, and therefore not only
does a translation from guest virtual address to guest physical address not
exist in the guest OS paging structures, but the data itself is not present in
memory. When an EPT violation corresponding to the now write-protected
guest page table entry occurs (indicating that the page containing the
probe location has been brought into memory by the guest OS), the CPU is
placed into single-step mode. After single-stepping through the instruction
that writes the guest page table entry,5 the probe is added by performing
the usual translations from GVA to GPA and traversing the guest paging
structures. This process of using page protection to insert probes into non-
resident locations is illustrated in Fig. 4.4. Note that the performance of
this technique could be improved slightly by avoiding the single-step and
decoding the trapped instruction that caused the EPT VIOLATION to obtain
the value of the instruction operand corresponding to the page table write.6
In practice with modern systems containing gigabytes of memory, however,
this situation where an application page resides on disk only occurs after
application startup (unless a page is swapped out due to memory pressure).
5Since the guest page table entry was EPT write protected, a VM Exit occurred and
the instruction writing the guest PTE was not executed. The guest PTE is not written
until the hypervisor removes write protection and allows the VM to continue executing
the instruction writing the guest PTE. A single step is used to ensure that the hypervisor
adds the probe at the very first time the translation for the intended probe location exists.
6Note that this PTE value is not readily available from the EPT violation; only the
guest physical and virtual address of the EPT VIOLATION are available from the VMCS.
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Figure 4.4: How a user space probe is added when accounting for
potentially paged-out probe locations. A guest virtual address (GVA) for
the probe’s location must be translated into a guest physical address
(GPA). If the translation fails because the page is not present, we write
protect the EPT page containing the guest page table entry (PTE) that
should contain the translation for the probe’s GVA. When the guest OS
attempts to update the guest page table entry, the hprobe kernel agent is
notified via an EPT VIOLATION and places the CPU in single step mode.
After the single step, the guest PTE is updated and the translation
succeeds, and the probe is added. © 2015 IEEE
In either case the disk latency to bring the page into memory would dominate
the additional latency from a VM Exit and the performance gain would be
negligible. Decoding the guest instruction therefore becomes undesirable due
to the complexity of addressing modes in Intel x86.
When performing reliability and security monitoring, it is necessary to
not only be aware of events in the VM (e.g., an instruction at a particular
address was executed), but also the state of the VM at the time of those
events (e.g., registers, flags). When inserting an hprobe from within the
hypervisor (i.e., using a kernel module in the Host OS), the hprobe kernel
agent passes a pointer to a structure containing vCPU state to the hprobe
handler. These privileged probe handlers can use this structure in addition
to KVM functions to learn additional information about the target VM or
possibly modify the state of the VM to mitigate a failure or vulnerability.
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4.2.4 Discussion
The use of int3 to generate an exception means that the hprobe framework’s
hook event generation is supported and enforced by the hardware: aside from
assuming the demand paging scheme with guest userspace probes, the hprobe
framework has no dependence on any functionality inside the guest OS. By
using only HAV hypervisor functionality the hprobe framework can be used
for any guest OS supported by the hypervisor. Since the majority of the
work is done outside of direct modifications to the KVM hypervisor (i.e., all
of the heavy lifting is done inside of the separate hprobe kernel agent), the
framework can also be ported to other hypervisors that support trapping on
int3.
The hprobe framework satisfies the design principles for an RSaaS hyper-
visor hook-based monitoring system set forth in Section 4.1.1:
1. Protection: By using an out-of-VM approach that is enforced by
HAV, hprobes cannot be circumvented. Furthermore, memory pro-
tection in the hypervisor can prevent probes from being modified.
2. Simplicity: Modifications to introduce the Event Forwarder and Helper
APIs to KVM add only 117 source-lines-of-code (SLOC) to KVM’s
codebase (the base KVM kernel module has approximately 45k SLOC
total) and the kernel agent is 703 SLOC. The simple API allows mon-
itors to be developed quickly and most detectors can be based on a
common boilerplate template (e.g., subsequent detectors can be built
by reusing a majority of the code from a previous detector since a
majority of the code is module initialization and parameter parsing,
unrelated to hprobe handling). As an anecdotal example, most of the
example detectors presented in Chapter 5 required only two hours of
programming to be fully functional. Hprobes can be used on a com-
pletely unmodified guest OS.
3. Dynamism: The hprobe API allows for the insertion and removal
of probes at runtime without disrupting the control flow of the target
VM. Furthermore, unique to hook-based VM monitoring systems at
the time of writing, the hprobe framework supports application level
monitoring through userspace probes.
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4. Performance: Multiple VM Exits are required on each probe hit,
and one must take that into account when designing hprobe monitors.
That said, for the test applications and use cases, the performance
is acceptable and worth the value added in terms of implementation
simplicity and dynamism. See Section 4.3.2 for analysis and details.
Further elaborating on the protection principle, the hprobe framework sat-
isfies the protection requirements adapted from Lares [5] in Section 4.1.1 and
Fig. 3.4. The notification N is only delivered if events occur legitimately
(non-hprobe related int3 exceptions are ignored by the hprobe kernel agent
and passed back to the VM). The context and information related to the
event (the VM’s state at event e) cannot be modified during hprobe process-
ing since the hypervisor is in control and blocks vCPU execution until the
single step event. The security application (e.g., a probe func()) runs inside
the hypervisor, and therefore its behavior B cannot be altered by the VM.
Additionally, the effects of any response R from the hypervisor are enforced
since the hypervisor has full control over the target VM. Since hprobes config-
ure VM Exits to occur on int3, one could envision a denial-of-service (DOS)
attack based on forcing VM Exits using many spurious int3 instructions.
However, hprobes do not present a new DOS threat in the KVM hypervisor.
If an attacker were interested in performing a DOS attack by introducing a
large number of VM Exits, he or she already has the functionality to do so
(e.g., using the vmcall instruction to invoke a large number of non-existent
hypercalls). Note that even if this DOS attack were to succeed, it would not
affect the hypervisor’s ability to manage its VMs. In fact, the microbench-
marks used to test hprobes in Section 4.3.2 effectively spam the hypervisor
with hprobe events. At no point during those benchmarks did the hypervisor
even stop responding, the only impact of the VM Exits is the reduction of the
useful work that can be completed by the VM (though if an attacker already
had access to run arbitrary code on the VM and the goal of the attack was
to slow down the VM, he/she could just generate I/O activity).
While using the hprobe framework does require modifications to the hy-
pervisor, these modifications are small in SLOC and robust across multiple
versions of KVM and the Linux kernel. During the course of this project,
we used the diff-match-patch libraries7 to migrate the Event Forwarder and
7https://pypi.python.org/pypi/diff-match-patch/
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Helper APIs between KVM versions. We have tested hprobes on Open-
SUSE 11.2, CENTOS7, Gentoo with kernel version 3.18.7, Ubuntu 12.04
using kernel versions 3.13.0-30-generic and 3.13.0-45-generic, and Ubuntu
14.04. The hprobe kernel agent is written to be agnostic to kernel versions
starting with 2.6 (e.g., #ifdef macros for kernel version specific constructs
like unlocked ioctl were used). To help ensure that our modifications do
not affect the robustness of the hypervisor, we confirmed that the KVM unit
tests8 pass on our modified version of KVM.
4.2.5 Limitations
The hprobe framework can be used as a key component in an RSaaS frame-
work, but it does have a few limitations. Namely:
1. Hprobes only trigger on instruction execution. If one is interested in
monitoring data access events (e.g., to be alerted every time a particular
address is read from/written to), hprobes do not provide a clean way
to do so. In order to monitor data reads/writes only using hprobes, one
would need to place a probe at every instruction that modifies the data
(potentially every instruction that modifies any data if addresses are
affected by user input). More cleanly, one could use an hprobe at the
beginning and end of a critical section to turn on and off page protection
for data relevant to that critical section, capturing the events in a
manner similar to livewire [3], but with the dynamism of hprobes. This
concept is used in the RSaaS ret2user detector presented in Chapter 8.
2. Hprobes are built on HAV and hprobe invocations involve multiple VM
Exits, resulting in higher performance overhead than other approaches
(e.g., SIM [7]). However, this tradeoff was chosen to have a simpler
and more robust implementation with its trust still rooted in HAV. A
key design decision behind RSaaS is that the monitoring system must
leave the guest OS unmodified.
3. Probes cannot be fully hidden from the VM. Even with clever EPT
tricks to hide the existence of a probe when reading from a page con-
taining a probe, a timing side channel would still exist since an attacker
8http://www.linux-kvm.org/page/KVM-unit-tests
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could observe that either the probed instruction takes longer than ex-
pected to complete or memory reads of a code page containing hidden
probe take longer than expected.
4.3 Hprobe Performance
4.3.1 Methodology
All of the microbenchmarks described in this section as well as the sample
detector performance evaluations in Chapter 5 were conducted on a Dell
PowerEdge R720 server with dual-socket Intel Xeon E5-2660 “Sandy Bridge”
2.20 GHz CPUs (3.0 GHz turbo boost).
Since a virtual machine does not have complete control over the hardware,
some care should be taken to ensure accurate measurements when trying to
obtain timing measurements, especially for low latency events. One partic-
ular problem for performance measurements is unstable timekeeping inside
the guest OS [74]. Since a VM timeshares with the host OS, there will be
more clock drift than expected for a physical server (e.g., when a vCPU gets
preempted). Also, one could expect clock drift to be more unpredictable as it
is dependent on the state of a live system (e.g. how applications running on
the hypervisor and other VMs use the system) compounded with expected
sources of clock instability (temperature fluctuations, etc). In the case of
VM benchmarks, there may also be VM Exits induced by other background
activities on the system. While there are well established techniques for
minimizing the effect of virtualization on accurate timekeeping (e.g. a para-
virtualized clock synchronized with the host, kvm-clock), precise timing
measurements in VMs can be difficult to obtain. For precise measurements,
it is considered best practice to use a stable reference outside of the VM [75].
In these experiments, we measure time from the host OS. To obtain runtime
measurements of activities inside the VM, an extra hypercall was added to
KVM. The hypercall is used to start and stop a timer inside the host OS.
This hypercall technique allows us to obtain more consistent measurements
than inside a VM with a potentially unstable clock. To ensure consistency
among measurements, the test VMs were rebooted between each sample.
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4.3.2 Microbenchmarks
In order to determine a lower bound for the overhead of hprobe-based detec-
tors, the base of overhead of hprobes must be quantified. This section con-
tains information and results from running hprobe microbenchmarks, that
is hprobes without a probe handler function. A microbenchmark aims to
estimate the latency of a single hprobe, which is the time from when the VM
executes int3 until the VM is resumed (Steps 1–3 in Fig. 4.2). The round-trip
latency of an individual VM Exit on Sandy Bridge CPUs has been estimated
to take roughly 290 ns [76] and the hypercall measurement scheme induces
additional VM Exits; it would be difficult to accurately measure individual
probe latency. Instead, a mean round-trip latency is obtained by repeatedly
executing a probed function many times (one million) and dividing the total
time taken for those executions by the number of executions. This aggregate
measurement of the mean helps remove jitter due to timer inaccuracies as
well as ensure that the actual latency of the hypercall measurement does not
affect the result. The test probe location was a no-op kernel module that
was added to the Guest OS. The kernel module creates a dummy noop de-
vice with an ioctl that calls a noop func() kernel function that performs no
useful work (it only includes a return 0). First, an hprobe is added to the
noop func()’s location. The microbenchmarking process starts by issuing a
hypercall to start the timer and then an ioctl against the noop device. When
the noop module in the guest OS receives the ioctl, it calls noop func() one
million times. Afterwards, another hypercall is issued from the benchmarking
application to read the timer value.
For the microbenchmarking experiment, a 32bit Ubuntu 14.04 guest was
used and 1000 samples were measured (that is, a total of 109 hprobe invo-
cations). The mean latency (across samples) was found to be 2.6 µs. In
addition to the Sandy Bridge CPU, the experiment was repeated on an older
generation 2.66 GHz Xeon E5430 “Harpertown” processor (running the same
kernel, KVM version, and a copy of the VM image). This CPU generation
was chosen since it is from the same timeframe as other hook-based mon-
itoring systems that will be used for comparison in the next section. The
Harpertown CPU had a mean latency of 4.1 µs. The distribution of latencies
for these experiments is shown in Fig. 4.5.
The hprobe prototype requires multiple VM Exits per probe hit and thus
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Figure 4.5: Latency of a single hprobe (parentheses indicate each CPU’s
release year). The E5-2660’s larger range can be attributed to “Turbo
Boost,” where the clock scales from 2.2 to 3.0 GHz. The shaded area is the
quartile range (25th percentile to 75th percentile), whiskers are
minimum/maximum, center is the mean, and notches in the middle are the
95% confidence interval of the mean. © 2015 IEEE
a fair amount of time is needed to process each hprobe. However, in many
practical cases the flexibility of dynamic monitoring and lower maintenance
due to a simple implementation outweigh this cost. This flexibility can in-
crease performance in many practical cases by allowing one to add and remove
probes throughout the VM’s lifetime, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 5.
Furthermore, CPU manufacturers are constantly working to reduce the im-
pact of VM Exits, as Intel’s VT-x saw an 80% reduction in VM Exit latency
over its first six years [76].
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4.4 Comparison to Past Hook-based Techniques
In the hprobe prototype implementation, the mean latency for a single hprobe
was 2.6 µs (4.1 µs for a CPU from 2007). This fits between the single-hook
latency of Lares (28 µs, published in 2008) and SIM (0.4 µs, published in
2009). While the raw overhead of a probe hit may appear relatively high, it
is important to remember that probe events are rare and even the sample ap-
plication benchmarks in Chapter 5 intentionally exercised the probes beyond
what may be typical for a real application. The dynamism of the hprobe
framework allows hprobe-based detectors to remove probes as needs change,
allowing an RSaaS system to disable detectors that are no longer needed at
runtime. It is difficult to achieve a similar flexibility with techniques that
have hooks statically inserted into the guest OS. In other hook-based systems,
in order to provide flexibility when guest OS modifications are required, one
would either have to maintain a set of guest OS kernels or use a scheme that
modifies a running kernel image from within the guest at runtime.
The hprobe hooking mechanism is enforced by the hardware since it is
supported by the VM Exit mechanism. As mentioned in Section 4.2.4, the
hprobe framework’s use of int3 with the VMCS exception bitmap configured
accordingly can be viewed as a system rooted in hardware architectural in-
variants [8, 43]. In this case, the invariant is that a properly functioning
virtual machine will generate VM Exits on exceptions that it is configured
to VM exit on (an assumption that is essential for a “trap-and-emulate”
VMM). To protect the hooks, one can use EPT or NPT and write protect
the pages that contain active probes. This write protection satisfies the se-
curity requirement where hooks cannot be evaded by actors inside the VM
(even attackers with guest OS privileges) and only incurs a performance im-
pact when pages containing probes are written to (a rare event for code in
memory, particularly guest OS code).
Quynh et al. utilized int3 to trap from a VM to the hypervisor in xen-
probes [77], which provides a guest OS kernel debugging interface for Xen
VMs. However, hprobes were developed with a focus on reliability and secu-
rity monitoring as opposed to debugging use cases. Additionally, xenprobes
can use an out-of-line execution area (OEA) to execute the replaced instruc-
tion (vs. always executing in place with a single step like the hprobe proto-
type does). The OEA provides a performance boost, but it results in a more
52
complex code base and carries the need to create and maintain a separate
memory region for this area. The OEA requires an OS driver to allocate
and configure the OEA at guest OS boot (increasing the burden for a RSaaS
system), and the OEAs are statically allocated at boot, placing a hard upper
bound on the number of supported probes (which is likely acceptable for de-
bugging, but not for dynamic reliability and security monitoring). In terms
of code complexity, the hprobe framework is simpler (less than 1000 lines of
code vs. 4000 lines of code) and likely yields a smaller attack surface since
no guest code is executed by hypervisor (which is not the case or a concern
in the OEA for the xenprobes debugging system).
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Chapter 5
Sample Hprobe Detectors
In this chapter, we present sample reliability and security detectors built upon
the hprobe prototype framework. While these detectors are only examples,
they are unique to the hprobe framework and cannot be implemented on any
other VM monitoring system at the time of writing. As in Chapter 4, the
benchmarks presented below use the hypercall timing system and the Sandy
Bridge E5-2660 based Dell PowerEdge R720.
5.1 Application Heartbeat Detector
5.1.1 Application Heartbeat Detector Design
One of the most standard and most used reliability techniques used to mon-
itor computing system liveness is a heartbeat detector. In a heartbeat de-
tector, a periodic signal is sent to an external monitor to indicate that the
system is functioning properly. Many networked applications have a form
of built-in heartbeat or timer, but applications that do not have a persis-
tent network connection to another host may not have any liveness-checking
mechanism like a heartbeat (e.g., a standalone scientific computing appli-
cation). Furthermore, network-based heartbeats are prone to false positives
caused by failure of the monitoring infrastructure (e.g., a dropped packet or
network fault). Even if an application does have a general heartbeat, one
may be interested in monitoring a particular component/function of that ap-
plication (either because it is known to fail or because it may be considered
more critical). A heartbeat detector serves as an illustrative example for how
an hprobe-based reliability detector can be implemented.
Using hprobes, we can construct a monitor that directly measures the ap-
plication’s execution. That is, since probes are triggered by application exe-
54
cution itself, they can be viewed as a mechanism for direct validation that the
application is functioning correctly. Many applications execute a repetitive
code block that is periodically reentered (e.g., a Monte Carlo simulation that
runs with a main loop, or an http server that constantly listens for new con-
nections). If one profiles the application, it is possible to determine a period
(in units of time or using a counter like the number of instructions) at which
this code block is reentered. During correct operation of the application, one
can expect that the code block will be executed at the profiled interval.
The operation of the hprobe-based application heartbeat detector is illus-
trated in Fig 5.1. This sample detector is implemented as a kernel module
that is installed in the Host OS (i.e., one of the detectors on the left side
of Fig. 4.1). In the application heartbeat detector, an hprobe is inserted at
the start of the code block that is expected to be periodically reentered (e.g.,
the main loop of an application). When the hprobe is inserted, a delayed
workqueue1 is scheduled to execute at a time in the future corresponding
to the expected reentry period for the code block. The workqueue function
alerts the host OS that a heartbeat has been missed. When the timeout
expires, the workqueue function is executed and declares the guest applica-
tion has failed. If the user desires a more aggressive watchdog detector, one
could have the hprobe handler perform an action such as restarting the ap-
plication or VM. During the application’s expected execution (i.e., when the
hprobe gets executed), the workqueue is canceled and a new workqueue is
scheduled for the same interval, starting a new timeout period. In this fash-
ion, application failure is detected whenever the time since the hprobe was
invoked is greater than the predetermined timeout. This scheduling, probe
invocation, and cancelling of the workqueue continues until the application
finishes or the user no longer desires to monitor that application and removes
the hprobe. If having an hprobe hit on every iteration of the main loop is
too costly, one can use a dynamic approach. In the dynamic monitoring ap-
proach, ensure that the probe is active for an acceptable time interval and it
can be added/removed until desirable performance is achieved (the detection
latency would still be low as a tight loop would have a small timeout value).
Dynamic monitoring for failure detection is revisited in the context of guest
OS hang detection in Chapter 7.
1http://www.makelinux.net/ldd3/chp-7-sect-6
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Figure 5.1: Basic operation of the Application Heartbeat Detector. A probe
is added to a critical section of the application that is executed periodically
(e.g., the main loop). During normal execution, a workqueue in the host
OS is reset whenever the probe is hit. In the presence of a failure (such as
an I/O hang due to a disconnected device), the workqueue expires and
executes a function to notify the host OS. © 2015 IEEE
5.1.2 Application Heartbeat Functional Evaluation
To test the application watchdog, we need to find an application that is in-
tended to run for a long time and does not have a built-in fault tolerance
mechanism. A good example application is a long-running scientific program
that can take many hours or days to complete. This is useful for an as-
a-service approach since many authors of scientific applications would like
to focus on application development and not on details such as fault toler-
ance. We use the open-source Path Integral Quantum Monte Carlo (pi-qmc)
simulator [78] as a test application.2 As is typical with scientific computing
applications, pi-qmc has a large main loop that is repeatedly executed over
the lifetime of the application. When profiling to determine the heartbeat
timeout, we only need to run the main loop a handful of times to deter-
mine the maximum expected time per iteration. This is possible since Monte
Carlo simulation involves repeated sampling and therefore repeated execu-
tion of the same functions. Furthermore, sources of non-determinism are
rare since pi-qmc is heavily CPU bound. After determining the expected
duration of each iteration, we set the heartbeat to timeout to twice the ex-
2available at: http://phys-tools.github.com/pi-qmc/
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pected value, set the detector to a statement at the end of the main loop,
and injected hangs (e.g., by sending SIGSTOP from within the guest OS)
and crashed the application (e.g., by sending SIGKILL in the guest OS). In
addition to interfering with the application’s execution, we also injected VM
suspends and crashes using libvirt. All crashes (including VM crashes since
the timer executes in the hypervisor) were detected.
5.1.3 Application Heartbeat Detector Performance Evaluation
For benchmarking the application heartbeat detector, we use the same pi-qmc
simulator from the previous section. The pi-qmc simulator allows configura-
tion of its internal sampling and we utilize this feature to vary the length of
the main loop. In order to determine how the detector impacts performance
we measure the total runtime of each iteration of the main loop. We mea-
sure both with and without the heartbeat active and run the program for 15
minutes. The results of these experiments are shown in Fig. 5.2.
From Fig. 5.2, we can see that the detector does not affect performance
in a statistically significant way. This is due to the fact that pi-qmc, like
many scientific computing applications, does a large amount of work in each
iteration of its main loop, making this loop a good choice for a probe location.
Furthermore, by setting the threshold of the detector to a conservative value
(such as twice the mean runtime), one can achieve fault detection in a far
more acceptable timeframe than other methods like manual inspection of
running compute jobs. Also, this detector goes beyond checking if the process
is still running - it can detect any fault that causes a main loop iteration to
halt (disk I/O hang, network outage when using MPI, software bug that does
not lead to a crash, etc). The fundamental principle of this detector is that
we detect failure by directly monitoring the application’s execution.
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Figure 5.2: Benchmarking of the application watchdog detector using the
main loop in the pi-qmc simulator. The horizontal axis indicates the scaling
of an internal loop in pi-qmc. The vertical axis shows a distribution of the
completion time for each iteration of the main loop. The boxplot
characteristics (e.g., quartile range) are the same as in Fig. 4.5. © 2015
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5.2 Infinite Loop Detector
5.2.1 Infinite Loop Detector Design
As anyone who has interacted with software knows, infinite loops are a com-
mon failure that can cause application hangs. When considering proper
execution of a loop in a program (that is likely not the main loop as in the
Monte Carlo example), the number of instructions executed in a given block
of code usually falls into a fixed range. The upper bound of the instructions
executed in a block is the worst case execution time (WCET) [79]. Determin-
ing the WCET is a well studied problem in real-time systems, and solving
it is beyond the scope of this work. For example, one can use an automated
system to infer loop invariants and bound the number of times a loop should
execute [80]. This allows one to measure the WCET in terms of a higher
level construct (e.g., the number of loop iterations). The infinite loop detec-
tor presented below does not apply only to loops: if one can identify a block
of code or function that is expected to be executed repeatedly, the number
of times that block is executed before the end is reached should also fall into
a fixed range.
Given a block of instructions representing the interior of a loop and the
WCET (either in units of time or the number of executions of that block),
one can build a detector using a pair of hprobes. When one knows the wall
clock time, one can insert an hprobe inside the block and another hprobe af-
ter the block. This two-probe detector is illustrated in Fig. 5.3. At the first
probe, a timer is started (using the same technique as the heartbeat detector
in Section 5.1). If the timer expires before the second probe (at the end) is
reached, the detector reports a failure. If there is concern that the hypervisor
or guest OS is over-provisioned and significant time sharing is taking place,
one can use architectural invariants [8, 43] to only count the time when the
application under consideration is being executed. This application-specific
time monitoring can be accomplished by monitoring context switch events
using the CR3 register. For the case where a bound on the number of execu-
tions of the block of code is known, one can place one probe at the beginning
of the loop and one immediately after the loop. If the probe inside the loop
is executed more times than expected without the block being exited, then
the detector can report failure (i.e., a range violation [81]). Depending on
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for(i=0; i<N; i++) {
...
}
//after loop
1st Probe
(counter)
2nd Probe
(reset)
Figure 5.3: Probe locations for the infinite loop detector (ILD). The ILD
has two modes of operation, both utilizing the same set of probes. In the
first mode, failure is declared when the loop executes more times than a set
threshold. The second mode of operation tracks the register state. If more
than a specified set of registers remains static for N iterations, failure is
declared. © 2015 IEEE
the needs of the user, the detector can either reset its state or remove itself
when the exit probe is hit.
In addition to using the WCET for bounding the maximum number of
loop iterations, one can also detect an infinite loop by observing the state
of the CPU [82]. If the register state remains static across many iterations,
one can infer that the application is hanging. The register state of the VM
is saved in the VMCS upon a VM Exit, and KVM stores this state in its
own structures to be reloaded immediately prior to the next VM entry. As
mentioned in Chapter 4, the hprobe detectors have access to this state upon
probe activation. Therefore, the infinite loop detector can check this state at
every loop iteration. If a thresholded number of general-purpose registers3
remain constant across a number of iterations greater than a threshold, one
can infer that the application is in an infinite loop. This register tracking
strategy can be combined with WCET techniques since the register state
may help identify whether or not the system is looping or providing useful
work.
3The threshold will usually be 1, as a register will often contain a loop iterator vari-
able. The loop iterator can easily be identified because it will be a register that is either
monotonically increasing or decreasing by one at each iteration
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5.2.2 Infinite Loop Detector Functional Evaluation
In order to test the infinite loop detector, we used the same example as
presented in Jolt [82]. That example is a bug found in a development branch
of the Exuberant Ctags source code indexer.4 In that bug, a string parsing
loop for interpreting Python strings would get stuck due to two variable
names being transposed in the source code. The example input for the ctags
indexer used in Jolt is the Python scientific computing package numpy.5
Specifically, the import tools.py file contains comments that are formatted
in such a way that the bug is exercised. In the fixed version of the code
the loop executes only one iteration each of the twelve times the loop is
entered, meaning a small threshold timeout could be used. Using both the
threshold and register state method, the infinite loop was easily detected in
all experiments since it executes at a rate of thousands of times per second.
5.2.3 Infinite Loop Detector Performance Evaluation
In order to measure the performance overhead of our infinite loop detector,
we use a patched version of the ctags application from Section 5.2.2. We
ran ctags on the entire numpy source tree 60 times and obtained the mean
runtime and 95% confidence interval. The results are tabulated in Table 5.1.
In these experiments, we utilized two implementations of the detector: a
“Na¨ıve” detector and a “Smart” detector. The Na¨ıve detector is the same
detector as presented in Section 5.2.2 and the Smart detector has probes
that dynamically add/remove themselves (i.e., the loop exit probe is only
added after the loop is entered). When starting the application, the code
segment containing the target function was paged out to disk (i.e., the VM
was rebooted before collecting each sample). The rows in Table 5.1 with
“Page fix” refer to the runs where the application was started for the first
time and we needed to use the EPT mechanism presented in Section 4.2.3.
We also ran experiments in which we forced the application to page in the
code page containing the target instruction at startup, represented by the
“No Page Fix” samples.
From Table 5.1 we can see that the performance impact of our solution
4http://ctags.sourceforge.net/
5http://www.numpy.org
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Table 5.1: Ctags on Numpy Source Tree © 2015 IEEE
Application Runtime (s) 95% CI (s) % overhead
Normal 1.13 0.0325 N/A
Na¨ıve ILD - Page Fix 1.26 0.0229 11.5
Na¨ıve ILD - No Page fix 1.26 0.0265 11.8
Smart ILD - Page Fix 1.14 0.0267 1.15
Smart ILD - No Page Fix 1.15 0.0215 1.9
to deal with paged-out user space application code is not statistically signif-
icant (compare the “Page Fix” rows of the same detector to the “No page
fix” rows). However, using a dynamic probing technique yields measurable
performance gains. In the Na¨ıve approach, the overall overhead is roughly
11.5% for these experiments. With the Na¨ıve detector, the first and second
probe get executed 2585 and 54308 times, respectively. The disparity in
execution of the first and second probe is due to the fact that in this appli-
cation the loop is often skipped over, but the instruction immediately after
the loop (i.e., what the second probe measures) is always executed. In the
Smart approach, the first and second probe both get executed 2585 times (as
a reminder, in correct operation of ctags for the numpy source tree the loop
has only one iteration so the second probe is added and executed only once
whenever the first probe is reached), yielding a nominal difference of 1-2%
between the Smart implementations and the base case without any probes.
If this loop had a large number of internal iterations, then one could use
a similar dynamic probe approach, but retain the exit (second) probe and
remove the internal (first) probe, adding it periodically or using a timeout
mechanism. This idea of removing and re-adding probes for increased per-
formance is explored further in the OS hang detection method discussed in
Chapter 7. Note that the capability behind the “Smart” approach is unique
to the dynamism in the hprobe framework and to the best of our knowledge
no other VM monitoring framework offers such capability.
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5.3 Emergency Exploit Detector
5.3.1 Emergency Exploit Detector Design
Most systems operators fear zero-day vulnerabilities as there is little that can
be done about those vulnerabilities until the vendor/maintainer of the soft-
ware releases a fix. Furthermore, even after a vulnerability is made public, a
patch takes time to be developed and must be put through a QA cycle before
deployment into a production environment. This can further be exacerbated
in environments with high availability concerns and stringent change control
requirements: even if a patch is available, it is often not possible to restart the
system or service until a regular maintenance window. This leaves operators
with a difficult decision: either risk damage from restarting a system with
an under-tested patch or risk damage from running an unpatched system.
Consider the CVE-2008-0600 vulnerability that resulted in a local root ex-
ploit through the vmsplice() system call [83, 84]. This example represents
a highly dangerous buffer overflow since a successful exploit allows one to
arbitrarily execute code in ring 0. Furthermore, there is a publicly available
program on the Internet for starting a shell with root privileges that exploits
the CVE-2008-0600 vulnerability. Since this exploit involves the base kernel
code (i.e., not a loadable module or driver), patching it would require in-
stalling a new kernel followed by a system reboot (or without a reboot using
techniques discussed at the end of this section). As discussed earlier, in many
operational cases a system reboot or OS patch can only be conducted dur-
ing a predetermined maintenance window. Furthermore, many organizations
would be hesitant to run a fresh kernel image on production systems without
having gone through a proper testing cycle first.
The vmsplice() system call is used to perform a zero-copy map of user
memory into a pipe. At a high level, the CVE-2008-0600 vmsplice() exploit
constructs specially crafted compound page structures in userspace that can
be used to trick the kernel into executing an arbitrary function. A compound
page is a structure that allows one to treat a set of pages as a single data
structure. Every compound page structure has a pointer to a destructor
function that handles the cleanup of the underlying pages in the compound
page. The exploit works by using an integer overflow to corrupt the kernel
stack and replace the kernel’s page structure references with references to the
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specially crafted compound pages in userspace. Before calling vmsplice(),
the exploit closes the pipe. Then vmsplice() is called and the compound
pages’ destructor function is invoked. This destructor is set to privilege
escalation shellcode that allows an attacker to hijack the system.
The CVE-2008-0600 exploit hinges on an integer overflow in one of the
system call arguments - a pointer to a struct iovec that contains the in-
teger value of iov len and is set to ULONG MAX in the exploit. Since Linux
uses registers to hold the system call number as well as arguments for sys-
tem calls [85], we could use classical system call monitoring/tracing tools to
detect this exploit [86–88]. In this system call tracking approach, we can
watch whenever a system call is invoked and parse arguments to detect an
integer overflow attempt whenever vmsplice() is invoked. However, since
hprobes are dynamic and can be added at runtime, instead of tracking all
system calls we can set a probe to trigger only on the sys vmsplice() function
(the internal kernel function called after the system call assembly linkage).
Adding the probe to sys vmsplice() ensures that only the execution path
of the vmsplice() system call is inspected as opposed to all system calls (as
would be in traditional system call tracing). When sys vmsplice() is exe-
cuted, the kernel is using the regular compiler function calling conventions
(in most versions of the Linux kernel, the gcc convention) and the arguments
are stored on the stack. Irrespective of the calling convention, we can use
hprobes to obtain these arguments. Pseudocode describing how the detector
is implemented is shown in Fig. 5.4. Essentially, one needs to ensure that
the value of iov len will not cause an overflow (which should never occur in
a benign case since an iov cannot occupy the entire virtual address space).
Depending on the environment, the operator can choose how to respond to
the detected exploit. One could send an alert, simply modify iov len to a
benign value that causes vmsplice() to fail (e.g., 0 in our testing), or take a
more drastic action (such as terminating the process or VM) if desired.
The emergency detector works by checking the arguments of a system call
for a potential integer overflow. This differs in functionality from the up-
stream patch,6 which checks if the memory region specified by the argument
is a valid memory region in userspace. One could write a probe handler
that performs a similar check by examining if all of the region referred to by
6https://gitorious.org/kernel-linux/linux-stable/commit/
af395d8632d0524be27d8774a1607e68bdb4dd7f
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1: procedure vmsplice handler(vcpu)
2: if 32-bit guest then
3: arg offset = 8 . 2nd arg on stack 32bit
4: max ← ULONG MAX 32 - PAGE SIZE
5: else
6: arg offset = 16 . 2nd arg on stack 64bit
7: max ← ULONG MAX 64 - PAGE SIZE
8: end if
9: . The read function checks for a valid address
10: iov pointer ← read guest(vcpu.esp+arg offset)
11: iov len ← read guest virt(iov pointer)
12: if iov len ≥ max then
13: HANDLE EXPLOIT ATTEMPT(vcpu)
14: end if
15: end procedure
Figure 5.4: Pseudocode for an hprobe based CVE-2008-0600 Detector. This
handler is executed when the vmsplice() system call is used. The overflow
occurs when a struct member in the second argument is ULONG MAX.
The code protects against the integer overflow by ensuring that if a
ULONG MAX argument that would cause an overflow is used, the exploit
is caught.© 2015 IEEE
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the struct iovec pointer + iov len is valid for the calling process (e.g., by
walking the page tables belonging to that process). However, a temporary
measure to protect against an attack should be as lightweight and simple
as possible to avoid unpredictable side effects. One major benefit of using
an hprobe handler is that developing this detector does not require a deep
understanding of the vulnerability: the developer of the emergency detector
only needs to understand that there is an integer overflow in an argument.
This is far simpler than developing and maintaining a patch for a core kernel
function (a system call), especially when reasoning about the risk of running
a home-patched kernel (a process that would void most enterprise service
level agreements).
5.3.2 Emergency Exploit Detector Functional Evaluation
Our solution uses a monitoring system that resides outside of the VM and
relies on a hardware-enforced int3 event. A would-be attacker cannot circum-
vent this event without having first compromised the hypervisor or having
modified the guest’s kernel code. This could be done with a code injection
attack that causes a different sys vmsplice() system call handler to be in-
voked. However, it is unlikely that an attacker who already has the privileges
necessary for code injection into the kernel would have anything to gain by
exploiting a local privilege escalation vulnerability. While this detector can-
not defeat an attacker that has previously obtained root access, the ease of
rapidly deploying a stopgap sufficiently mitigates this risk. Since no reboot
is required and the detector can be used in a “read-only” monitoring mode
(only reporting the attack vs. taking an action such as killing the VM), the
risk of using this detector on a running production system is minimal. To
test the CVE-2008-0600 detector, we used a CENTOS5 VM (the exploit was
discovered while the source-equivalent Red Hat Enterprise Linux 5.0 OS was
in production) and the publicly available exploit. As an unprivileged user,
we ran an exploit script on the unpatched OS and were able to obtain root
access. With the monitor in place, all attempts to obtain root access using
the exploit code were detected.
Ksplice [89], a rebootless kernel patching mechanism, can be used in a
similar fashion as the vmsplice() emergency detector. Ksplice allows for live
66
kernel patching by replacing a function call with a jump to a new patched
version of that function. The 4.0 version of the Linux kernel was scheduled
to incorporate a rebootless patching feature [90]. The planned Linux 4.0
feature used ftrace7 to switch to a new version of the function after some
safety checks. However, those safety checks were still not stable in time for
the 4.0 release and the feature is not yet merged into the mainline kernel
at the time of writing. In particular, ensuring that the stack is consistent
has proven to be exceptionally challenging, with the stack validation checks
having been revised 13 times and still not production ready [91, 92]. While
these rebootless patching techniques can be useful for patches that have been
properly tested and worked through a QA cycle, many operators would be
uneasy with an untested patch on a live OS. When considering newly re-
ported vulnerabilities, hprobe’s simple interface allows one to quickly deploy
an out-of-band monitor to detect the vulnerability without modifying the
control flow of a running kernel. Since the monitoring only reads the state of
the guest OS and checks are performed outside of the kernel, there is little
risk of crashing the system or causing unwarranted side effects. When com-
pared to rebootless patching techniques, there is no concern with how hprobe
emergency detectors interact with the guest OS stack. If and when rebootless
patching becomes stable, hprobe temporary monitoring could even be used
to provide a stopgap measure while a rebootless patch is in QA testing: one
could use the monitor immediately after a vulnerability is announced and
until the patch is vetted and safe to use. A technique like this would dras-
tically reduce the vulnerable window and alleviate pressure to perform risky
maintenance outside of critical windows. It should be noted that while our
example focused on a kernel vulnerability, this emergency detector technique
can be extended to a user space program.
5.3.3 Emergency Exploit Detector Performance Evaluation
The integer overflow detector that protects against the CVE-2008-0600 vmsplice()
vulnerability is extremely lightweight for most use cases. Unless vmsplice()
is used, the overhead of the detector is zero since the probe will not be exe-
cuted. The vmsplice() system call is rare (at least in open source repositories
7http://elinux.org/Ftrace
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that we searched), so this zero overhead is overwhelmingly the common case.
Keeping in mind that security vulnerabilities are often found in “cold” re-
gions of code [93], we believe this low-overhead should extend beyond the
vmsplice() example.
One application that uses vmsplice() is Checkpoint/Restart in Userspace
(CRIU).8 CRIU uses vmsplice() to capture the state of open file descriptors
referring to pipes. We used the Folding@Home molecular dynamics simulator
[94] and the pi-qmc Monte Carlo simulator as test programs. We ran these
applications in a 64-bit Ubuntu 14.04 VM. For each sample, we allowed the
application to warm up (load input data and start the main simulation)
and then initiated a checkpoint using CRIU. Since CRIU is an open source
application, we inserted timing hypercalls directly into CRIU to measure
how long it takes to save the checkpoint of an application. The checkpoint
experiments were repeated 100 times for each case with and without the
detector and the results are tabulated in Table 5.2. From the table, we can
see that there is a slight difference in the mean checkpoint time (roughly 3.3%
for F@H and 1.7% for pi-qmc) and that the variance in the experiment with
the detector active is higher when taking a checkpoint of Folding@Home.
When checkpointing Folding@Home, sys vmsplice() was called 28 times,
whereas sys vmsplice was called 11 times for pi-qmc. We attribute this
performance difference not only to probe latency, but also to the negative
cache effects of the VM/Host OS context switch when activating probes.
We also measured a class of “Na¨ıve” detector that probes the system call()
function (the entry point for all system calls) as opposed to sys vmsplice().
This na¨ıve detector checks the system call number and then the arguments
to ensure that the integer overflow will not occur. In the na¨ıve case where we
probe on all system calls, we can see that there is a significant performance
penalty (and the number of probe invocations increases from ∼ 10-30 to ∼
3000). We remind the reader that the detector only probes sys vmsplice(),
meaning that the overhead in this experiment is only incurred when taking
a checkpoint and the actual execution of the scientific applications is not
affected.
8http://www.criu.org/
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Table 5.2: CVE-2008-0600 Detector Performance Evaluation using
Checkpoint/Restart In Userspace © 2015 IEEE
Application Runtime ± 95% CI (s) overhead (%)
F@H Normal 0.221 ± 0.0092 0
F@H w/hprobe 0.228 ± 0.012 3.30
F@H w/Na¨ıve 0.253 ± 0.0085 14.4
pi-qmc Normal 0.137 ± 0.0063 0
pi-qmc w/hprobe 0.140 ± 0.0073 1.73
pi-qmc w/Na¨ıve 0.152 ± 0.0051 11.1
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Chapter 6
Using OS Constructs to Bypass the Semantic
Gap
6.1 Purpose and Motivation
The “as a service” computing model can be characterized by many traits [95],
but the ones most useful for reliability and security are on-demand capabil-
ities and increased automation. In order to provide reliability and security
monitors with those functionalities, we need a platform that allows us to
change how we monitor a running system without affecting that system,
while allowing us to have complete access to the system’s state (user and OS
address spaces, hardware, etc.). VM monitoring can satisfy both of these
requirements since the hypervisor has complete control of and access to the
underlying guest OS.
Traditional VM monitoring methods (i.e., VMI [3,35]) rely on specific guest
OS offsets and addresses to decode VM data structures. As such, VMI-based
monitors are subject to the semantic gap and must be adapted for every
target version of the guest OS. Furthermore, the information decoded by VMI
describes the state of the VM, but does not provide much information on what
the VM is actually doing at a given time. To avoid the semantic gap, existing
VM monitoring research has used privileged hardware events to gain insight
into VM operation [6,8,43]. While robust against attackers, those approaches
are limited in functionality (i.e., to privileged hardware operations that can
generate VM Exit events). To overcome that limited functionality, other
event based systems add hooks to the underlying VM. These hooks transfer
control to the monitoring program when the VM reaches a point of interest
in its execution [5, 53, 77]. The hprobe framework introduced in Chapter 4
is an example of such a hook-based monitoring system. However, hook-
based approaches like hprobes reintroduce the need for semantic information
(i.e., knowledge of guest OS function addresses such as hook locations). The
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approach presented in this chapter provides a novel alternative for dealing
with the semantic gap by developing monitors that rely on OS constructs
than can be used to infer any necessary semantic information.
Since our technique bypasses the semantic gap and takes advantage of
hprobes’ ability to adapt monitoring at runtime, we envision these combined
techniques being used as the backend in a system where a user is offered
reliability and security monitors as a service. As a research implementation,
we limit the scope of our RSaaS system to the components that perform
monitoring and not the actual user interface that would be part of such a
system. The rest of the cloud API and interface (e.g., integration with a
framework like OpenStack1) are left as future engineering work.
6.2 Approach
We bypass the semantic gap by using OS constructs to infer version-specific
monitoring parameters. OS constructs are useful for inferring parameters
because while the hypervisor has access to the full state of the guest OS
(e.g., memory and registers), the hypervisor does not have an interpretation
of what that hardware state represents. OS constructs allow us to identify
events of interest for monitoring based on hardware events visible to the
hypervisor (e.g., a system call is represented by a sysenter instruction).
To identify parameter values for a particular guest OS version, we look for
changes in the hardware state, whether in the form of an interrupt/exception,
a register access, or the execution of a specific instruction. These hardware
interactions map directly to core OS functionality and allow us to develop
VM monitoring tools that use those parameters without. Our method for
translating low-level information available to the hypervisor to high-level
information usable for monitoring is illustrated in Fig. 6.1.
The workflow for building a monitor based on our OS construct approach
is shown in Fig. 6.2. Starting with a specification for a monitor, we choose
an OS construct that can be used to provide information that satisfies the
specification. After choosing an OS construct, we identify the monitor’s pa-
rameters. We define a parameter as an aspect of the guest OS needed for
hypervisor-level monitoring that is expected to change with the OS version
1http://openstack.org
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Original Hypervisor view
OS 1
insn x at address 0xabc
OS 2
insn x at address 0xdef
OS 3
insn x at address 0x123
The hypervisor has access to the
VM's state, but the semantics of the 
guest OS are obscured
We infer meaning in the 
low-level details of the
guest OS's actions based
on OS constructs
We reconstruct the guest OS view
in the hypervisor using our inferred
information
HW Event that
implies OS
construct:
 interrupt
 register access
 insn executed
OS 1
function() was executed
OS 2
function() was executed
OS 3
function() was executed
Hypervisor view using RSaaS
Figure 6.1: Using OS constructs, we are able to assign meaning to the
low-level data available to the hypervisor. In the example shown above, we
are able to determine that a particular function was called because a special
instruction was executed.
(e.g., a function address, interrupt number). The next step is to identify
version-specific parameters and then determine a hardware event that is as-
sociated with the OS construct used for monitoring. After identifying the
hardware event associated with the parameter, one can find the value of the
parameter by running the VM and observing that hardware event.
6.2.1 Summary of Guest OS Information Inferred in Example
Detectors
A core contribution of this dissertation is to demonstrate how one could build
detectors using both hprobes and the techniques presented in this section.
The insight behind our observations on how to extract useful information
from fundamental OS operations is best demonstrated through examples.
The examples presented in Chapters 7-9 are summarized in Table 6.1.
6.3 Prototype
6.3.1 Example Architecture for Reliability and Security as a
Service
Integrating our OS construct approach into an RSaaS prototype combines
both a Dynamic Analysis Framework (DAF) and a VM Monitoring Frame-
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Monitor 
specification 
Determine HW 
events that are 
associated with the 
OS constructs 
At runtime, obtain 
the values of the 
parameters that 
change for a given 
guest OS 
Log all processes 
started in the guest 
OS 
A sysenter 
instruction executes 
with the register 
%ebx=/sbin/init 
For CENTOS 5.0, 
sys_execve() is 
located at: 
0xc04021f5 
Identify monitoring 
parameters whose 
values change across 
OS versions 
Choose OS constructs 
needed to monitor 
the desired behavior 
The address of the 
sys_execve() 
function 
There is a system call 
that is invoked to 
start a user process 
Figure 6.2: The workflow used when building a detector for the Reliability
and Security as a Service framework. The light-colored boxes on the top
describe the high-level workflow, and the bottom darker-colored boxes show
the same workflow for identifying the process creation system call. After
this workflow has been completed by the cloud provider, the monitor is
ready to be deployed transparently across various customer VM instances.
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Figure 6.3: Architecture proposed in this work. Each monitor is defined by
a Dynamic Analysis Framework (DAF) plugin and a VM Monitoring
Framework (VMF) plugin (gray boxes).
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Table 6.1: Parameter Inference in Example RSaaS Detectors
Monitor OS Construct Parameters How Parameters are
Inferred
OS Hang
Detection
During correct
OS execution,
the sched-
uler will run
periodically.
The scheduler
address; the max-
imum expected
time between
calls to the
scheduler
Find the function
that changes process
address spaces; record
the maximum time
observed between pro-
cess changes when the
system is idle.
Return2User
Attack De-
tection
The transition
points between
userspace and
kernelspace are
finite; code in
userspace is
never executed
with system
permissions.
The addresses for
the entry and exit
points of the OS
kernel
Observe the changes in
permission levels and
record all addresses at
which those changes
occur.
Keylogger
Detection
A keyboard
interrupt will
cause processes
that handle
keyboard input
to be scheduled.
Interrupt number
for the keystroke;
number of pro-
cesses expected
to respond to a
keystroke
Use virtual hardware
to send a keystroke
and record the in-
terrupt number that
responds; observe
scheduling behavior
after a keystroke.
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work (VMF). The DAF performs the parameter inference step specific to
each cloud user’s VM (e.g., finding guest OS system call addresses). The
VMF performs the runtime VM monitoring. The architecture for the RSaaS
prototype is shown in Fig. 6.3. Note that the proposed approach is quite
general and other implementations may choose to use different techniques
for parameter inference (e.g., static binary analysis of the guest OS kernel
image) or runtime monitoring (e.g., kprobes for containers [71]). The user
selects a monitor to deploy to his or her VM and that monitor is represented
by two monitoring plugins: one for the DAF and one for the VMF (alterna-
tively, we imagine scenarios where the provider may not wish to expose the
plugin selection interface to the user).
6.3.2 Dynamic Analysis Framework
When performing parameter inference through dynamic analysis, we use a
gray-box approach where the only input needed from the customer is their
VM image. This allows us to maintain an as-a-service approach that does
not modify the customer’s underlying VM. While there are no specific input
parameters, each DAF plugin does use a set of assumptions based on OS
constructs (e.g., that an x86 OS uses privilege ring 3 for user applications
and 0 for the OS kernel).
The only general assumptions made during dynamic analysis are that: (1)
the cloud provider has access to the user’s VM image and (2) the dynamic
analysis framework can boot that VM image.
A1. The cloud provider has access to the VM’s image
A2. The cloud provider can boot that image in an emulator
We can see that those assumptions hold true for both public and private
clouds as the provider needs to have the user’s VM image in order to run
the user’s VMs (A1). Many hypervisors use an emulator to provide virtual
devices to VMs and therefore the VM image is compatible with an emulator
(A2).
For the prototype DAF used in this work, we chose the open-source Dy-
namic Executable Code Analysis Framework (DECAF) [60] as introduced
in Section 3.6.3. We chose DECAF because it is based on QEMU [9] and
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therefore supports a VM image format that is compatible with the popular
Xen and KVM hypervisors (satisfying A2 from above).2
6.3.3 VM Monitoring Framework
For the VMF, we use hprobes, as introduced in Chapter 4. Using hprobes,
monitoring plugins can be added and removed at runtime without disrupt-
ing the guest OS or hypervisor. In addition to hook-based monitoring func-
tionality, we also add a set of callbacks to the KVM hypervisor to receive
information about certain events of interest (e.g., on a VM Exit, an EPT
page fault). In addition to the hprobe framework code, all of the monitoring
API and RSaaS monitors presented later in this thesis are implemented as
external kernel modules totaling 1680 lines of C code (including redundant
boilerplate code used across different monitors). To help ensure that our
modifications do not affect the robustness of the hypervisor, we confirmed
that the KVM unit tests3 pass on our modified version of KVM. It is impor-
tant to note that the interfaces we add should not increase the attack surface
of the hypervisor, as we do not add new transition points to and from the
hypervisor and any data read from the VM is bounded and not used directly
by the hypervisor.
6.3.4 Machine Configuration
Unless otherwise noted, all performance benchmarks for RSaaS detectors in
Chapters 7-9 were performed on a machine with an Intel® Core™ i7-4790K
CPU. The CPU has a clock frequency of 4.00GHz, the machine has 32GiB
of DDR3 1333 MHz of RAM with a Hitachi HUA723020ALA640 7200RPM
6.0Gb/s SATA hard disk drive. This machine ran Ubuntu 14.04 LTS, though
development also occurred on machines with various hardware running CEN-
TOS7 and Ubuntu 12.04 LTS.
2Note that to support detailed analysis, DECAF uses QEMU in full emulation, whereas
QEMU+KVM is used to run the VM at runtime
3http://www.linux-kvm.org/page/KVM-unit-tests
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6.3.5 Prototype Discussion
Our main target for testing is the Linux OS (various distributions). Despite
Linux being open-source, the cloud provider cannot use a white-box approach
for inferring monitoring parameters since each distribution, or even each
user, can configure the OS differently. We maintain our gray-box approach
and only use OS semantics that can be obtained from our dynamic analysis
or from version agnostic OS constructs (e.g., paging, published ABI, and
privilege levels) and do not rely on or use the source code. Linux is a natural
choice as a target OS for monitoring as-a-service as data from Amazon’s
EC2 shows that there are an order of magnitude more Linux servers running
in EC2 (the most popular public cloud by usage statistics) than the next
most popular OS [96]. Nevertheless, to demonstrate the versatility of our
technique, we also present a keylogger detection example using Windows
7 in Chapter 9.
We can evaluate this prototype system partially in terms of the cloud com-
puting aspects given in the NIST definition of cloud computing, as described
in Section 2.6:
• On-demand self-service: This system is appropriate as the back-end
for an on-demand monitoring service as it operates with the existing
VM image as input and monitors can be added/removed at runtime.
• Broad network access: In addition to already being present in the
IaaS system that RSaaS is built on top of, the assumption of broad
network access is necessary for the deployment and transfer of VM
images.
• Resource pooling: Once developed, monitors can be shared among
multiple customers. Dynamic analysis only needs to be performed once
per customer’s OS kernel.
• Rapid elasticity: RSaaS monitors are elastic by their on-demand na-
ture. Monitors can be added/removed and enabled/disabled at runtime
without disrupting a running VM. In all experiments, monitors were
added after the VM had been started.
• Measured service: The provider can measure differing levels of ser-
vice based on the type and amount of monitors the user enables. Since
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monitoring is controlled completely at the hypervisor level, it would be
straightforward for the provider to accurately bill a cloud customer.
6.4 Discussion
The monitoring system presented in this dissertation is a hook-based sys-
tem. Therefore, the aspect of the semantic gap that applies most directly
to this work is building a high-level understanding of the guest OS’s exe-
cution. Specifically, when the VM executes an instruction at an address,
the hypervisor does not have an understanding of what higher-level opera-
tion is represented by that instruction. For hook-based monitoring, we solve
the inverse problem: based on a monitoring specification, the cloud provider
knows what operation they would like to monitor, but needs the address of
that operation in order to add a hook.
6.4.1 System Model
In order to reason about our technique for bypassing the semantic gap, we
consider an abstract model of an OS kernel. Since specific hardware architec-
tures and OS implementations change, viewing the system from a modeling
perspective helps us reason about how this work can apply to future systems.
Figure 6.4 illustrates a classical model of an OS kernel from Iain Craig’s For-
mal Models of Operating System Kernels [97]. In the OS model presented
in Fig. 6.4, the main purpose of the OS is to run a set of user applications
as processes that share the same hardware. These processes are isolated ex-
cept for Inter-Process Communication (IPC) services provided by the OS.
The processes are allowed to request assistance from the OS through a set
of standard System Calls. Services provided in the lower levels of the kernel
such as the Process Table and Low-Level Scheduler manage the processes.
In our approach, we identify semantic information about the guest OS that
can be observed at the hardware layer. This semantic information is lower-
level information (e.g., instruction addresses) that can be used to identify a
higher-level OS construct (e.g., a context switch occurred). The term “OS
constructs” used throughout this dissertation maps to the term “kernel prim-
itives” in the classical kernel model. Since kernel primitives or OS constructs
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Figure 6.4: A classical model of an OS from Formal Models of Operating
System Kernels. The work presented in this chapter focuses on using OS
constructs (called kernel primitives in the model) to address the semantic
gap in VM monitoring. Copyright 2007 Springer, used with permission
under license number 3932820616060.
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sit at the hardware/software interface, they can be inferred using hardware
events (e.g., the low-level scheduler changes page tables). However, since
these primitives are at the lowest software layer, they are version-agnostic
(e.g., in Linux each process has its own virtual address space). We note that
in many cases, one is interested in information in abstraction layers above ker-
nel primitives (e.g., at the system call layer). When considering these higher
layers, one must identify additional constructs for each abstraction layer. In
the system call example, depending on the system call of interest, one would
need to also consider the kernel interface routines and how those interact
with the primitives before moving up to the system call layer. For example,
we use information about the init System Process in Fig. 6.2 to identify
the process creation system call. That said, including constructs from higher
abstraction layers constrains the approach to a level of specificity that only
applies to a single class or even version of an operating system (e.g., monitors
based on POSIX conventions are not guaranteed to work for Windows).
Architectural Dependence
In Chapters 7-9, we present a set of example monitors implemented using the
x86 architecture. An important question is how architecture dependent are
the OS constructs we used to bypass the semantic gap for those monitors.
For example, in the OS hang detector from Chapter 7, we use x86’s CR3
register to identify a process at the hypervisor level. The concept behind our
choice for CR3 is not restricted to x86. For example, the Translation Table
Base Control Register is used to point to the current page tables in the ARM
architecture. Even though we can find isomorphisms between x86 and ARM,
our use of particular hardware events does restrict the individual detectors
to processors that implement certain features. For example, in the OS hang
detector, we assume that an MMU is present and paging is enabled, allowing
us to use a particular register to identify processes.4 Given this discussion, we
believe that assuming an MMU is a reasonable assumption for a system that
runs multiple processes. Even if in some future OS on a future architecture
virtual memory is no longer used to isolate processes, one can expect another
4As a side note, if one were to use the hardware context switching features of x86, the
Task Register TR could be used to uniquely identify processes, so paging is not strictly
required.
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hardware construct that would be correlated with processes running on the
system.
6.4.2 Security and Reliability Models
The goal of this work is to improve the state of the art in reliability and
security monitoring. However, the monitoring system presented cannot be
used to detect all failures and attacks as it can be argued that it is impossi-
ble to prove that any one monitoring system detects all failures and attacks.
Given this fundamental limitation of monitoring, it is important to under-
stand what classes of failures and attacks can be detected by the system
presented in this dissertation.
A hook-based VM monitoring system invokes the hypervisor when the VM
reaches a certain point in its control flow. Therefore, most of the detection
offered by this system involves detecting control flow related failures and
attacks. Control flow based detection can be used to detect crash failures as
the absence of progress on a certain control flow path is indication of incorrect
behavior. Attacks that violate expected control flow can be detected based
on an observed change in the execution of critical paths in the control flow
(e.g., a function is or is not executed). If desired, one could build a complete
control flow integrity (CFI) monitor using our system. This monitor would
use the DAF to construct a control flow graph (CFG) and then ensure that
the system does not deviate from its expected CFG [98]. However, VM Exit
based CFI is not practical for production systems due to an extremely high
expected overhead from inducing a VM Exit at every branch instruction. For
data-based attacks, we can detect attacks that have a measurable influence
on the control flow. For example, the keylogger detector in Chapter 9 detects
an attack when keystroke data flows to a malicious process by observing that
the malicious process is scheduled after keystrokes.
6.4.3 Interface
The intended use of RSaaS is for the cloud provider to develop trusted mon-
itoring plugins that are then shared with a cloud customer through the stan-
dard cloud interface. Based on the current prototype that uses kernel mod-
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ules, we do not expect providers to open the ability to develop monitoring
plugins to cloud users without additional features to protect this hypervisor-
level development from affecting other users’ VMs. The skill required to
develop DAF (DECAF) and VMF (hprobe) plugins is roughly the same as
that required for kernel module development, and this effort can be amor-
tized by reusing the plugins across customer VMs. Since cloud providers run
extremely large systems and have administrators with expert-level OS expe-
rience, we do not view the skill requirement as detrimental to the adoption
of our technique.
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Chapter 7
OS Hang Detection
7.1 Motivation
One of the biggest limitations of cloud computing is the lack of physical access
to computing resources. Since users must access their cloud resources through
a network interface (e.g., VMs), a lack of responsiveness can be due to either a
network failure or a system failure. To help isolate the possibility of network
failures and diagnose system failures due to issues with the guest OS, we
introduce an OS hang detector. Like the “smart” detectors in Chapter 5, this
hang detector demonstrates the concept of dynamic monitoring to increase
the performance of a monitor.
While some hypervisors provide a watchdog device,1 that device requires
a guest OS driver and therefore is not amenable to an as-a-service approach.
We propose a hang detector based on the activity of the guest OS sched-
uler. Our approach requires no drivers or configuration from the guest OS
and can be added at runtime. Furthermore, though OS hangs are not the
most common failure mode, they are catastrophic. However, as any organiza-
tion running large scale systems understands, even the most unlikely failure
modes become common at scale and IaaS clouds represent some of the largest
computing systems in existence [99].
The main concept behind the OS hang detector is that regardless of whether
processes are running or not, the OS scheduler runs periodically. This de-
tector works by reporting a hang if the scheduler does not execute when it
is expected to.
1https://libvirt.org/formatdomain.html#elementsWatchdog
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7.2 Hang Detector DAF Plugin
A hook-based hang detector based on how often the scheduler runs requires
two version-specific guest OS parameters: (1) the address of the scheduler
and (2) the maximum expected interval between invocations of the sched-
uler. A guest OS hang is therefore detected when the instruction at the
scheduler’s address is not executed within the maximum expected interval,
similar to a traditional heartbeat detector (as presented in Section 5.1). Mea-
suring the maximum scheduling interval allows us to choose a timeout value
that minimizes detection latency but also does not have false positives. The
parameter inference step of the OS hang detector locates the address of the
scheduler and then profiles the scheduler to determine a timeout interval for
the detector.
Note that in earlier versions of the Linux kernel, the scheduler was invoked
at a regular interval based on a timer “tick.” The tick was configurable
and defaulted to 1000Hz (one tick is called a jiffy, a measure of time used
throughout kernel code). Recent kernels, however, have moved to a “tickless”
approach to reduce power consumption [100,101]. With a tickless kernel, the
scheduler no longer runs at a fixed frequency, so the maximum measured
scheduler interval depends on OS configuration and the software installed
(i.e., systems running a variety of applications will have more scheduler in-
vocations). We emphasize that while the there is no well defined timer tick
in tickless kernels, there are other activities that occur while the system is
idle and an idle system should still have an upper bound on the maximum
time between scheduler invocations.
In order to identify the address of the scheduler, we recognize that the
scheduler will update the CR3 value when changing virtual address spaces as
part of a process switch. While other functions also write to CR3, we have ob-
served that the scheduler is the only function that consistently writes to CR3
over time. This leads to a simple heuristic: the scheduler is simply the func-
tion that writes to CR3 the most. However, the instruction of the scheduler
that writes the CR3 register is not called on every invocation of the sched-
uler: it is only called when processes are changed. To identify the scheduler,
which is the calling function from the address of the instruction that per-
forms the CR3 write, we read the VM’s memory backwards from the location
of that instruction. We read backwards until we identify a function header
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1: procedure on instruction end(cpu state)
2: if sched address != NULL then
3: delta t ← last time - current time
4: if delta t > largest delta t then
5: largest delta t ← delta t
6: end if
7: last time ← current time
8: else
9: if instruction == mov ∗, cr3 then
10: if last eip == current eip then
11: if count ≥ threshold then
12: sched address ← function(eip)
13: else
14: count+=1
15: end if
16: else
17: last eip ← current eip
18: count ← 0
19: end if
20: end if
21: end if
22: end procedure
23: procedure function(address)
24: /*Find the calling function that contains this address*/
25: function not found ← false
26: while function not found do
27: if *address == push %ebp;mov %esp,%ebp then
28: return address
29: end if
30: address-=1
31: end while
32: end procedure
Figure 7.1: Pseudocode for OS hang detection. This procedure is executed
after every instruction in DECAF. In x86, EIP is the register containing the
instruction pointer. Safety measures in the actual code (e.g., a maximum
search threshold) are omitted for brevity.
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(using the gcc calling convention for x86, the assembly function call header is
push %ebp;mov %esp, %ebp ). To identify the maximum scheduling interval,
we boot the VM image and monitor calls to the identified scheduler. Pseu-
docode for the component implemented in DECAF is presented in Fig 7.1.
In this implementation, we decided to use the instruction end callback (DE-
CAF INSN END) as we wanted to showcase the use of calling conventions
to obtain the start of a function. Alternatively, we could have used a dif-
ferent callback (e.g., DECAF BLOCK END CB or DECAF OPCODE RANGE CB) to track
call instructions leading up to the CR3 write. While we did not encounter
Linux with in-kernel Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) [102,103]
in our experiments, if the system is using in-kernel ASLR, an offset from a
fixed location in the kernel text section (e.g., from the SYSENTER EIP MSR)
as opposed to the scheduler’s address could be used since both the scheduler
address and system call handler are in the text section of the main kernel.
The hang detection analysis plugin makes the following assumptions:
1. A process change can be signaled by a change of virtual address spaces
(write to CR3).
2. CR3 writes are performed by a function that uses an expected calling
convention (we can also use alternate heuristics, such as tracking call
instructions).
3. The system boots into an idle loop or a state that would exhibit a min-
imal scheduling frequency (e.g., the user’s application with no work-
load).
We find the interval measured from the DAF plugin to be an upper bound
on the scheduling interval. The OS and any applications configured to start
at boot will enter an idle state after boot. At run time, we expect more
activity due to input and therefore more scheduling events. Furthermore,
we introduce overhead from emulation and dynamic analysis, which slightly
inflates the measured scheduling interval.
Table 7.1 summarizes the results from running the DAF plugin for finding
the scheduler address and maximum measured scheduling interval on various
kernel versions. Note that for Fedora 11 the plugin did not identify the sched-
uler. However, the hang detector will still detect a kernel hang for Fedora
11 as the switch mm function is called when processes are changed (process
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Figure 7.2: Dynamic monitoring example: the hypervisor is notified when
the scheduler runs. During a hang the hook is still added but the scheduler
does not run.
changes have been used for hang detection in the past [8]). Even though
hangs will still be detected by watching switch mm instead of schedule, the
frequency at which switch mm is called is lower than schedule, causing a
higher detection latency when using switch mm.
7.3 Hang Detector VMF Plugin
The runtime monitoring plugin works by adding an hprobe to the identi-
fied scheduler address. If the time between hprobe invocations exceeds the
maximum expected scheduling interval, the system raises an alert. There
is a performance concern with adding hprobes to the scheduler as hprobes
work by using hardware-enforced VM Exit events. If one generates a VM
Exit event on every scheduler invocation, there could be significant over-
head (e.g., for the traditional 1000Hz timer there would be 1000 VM Exits
per second). However, to detect an OS hang we do not need to hook ev-
ery single call to the scheduler. Instead, we can take a dynamic monitoring
approach. We add an hprobe to the scheduler and when that hprobe is acti-
vated, we remove the hprobe. We then queue another hprobe to be added at
the scheduler’s address after the expected scheduling interval. This dynamic
monitoring approach is illustrated in a timing diagram presented in Fig. 7.2.
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Table 7.1: Functions Identified as the Scheduler by Dynamic Analysis
OS Function Name Interval (s) Kernel Version
CENTOS 5.0 schedule 3.5193 2.6.18-8.el5
CENTOS 5.4 schedule 0.2507 2.6.18-398.el5PAE
Fedora 11 switch mm 20.0120 2.6.29.4-167.fc11.i686.PAE
Ubuntu 10.10 schedule 1.0077 2.6.35-32-generic-pae
Arch Linux schedule 1.7563 3.17.6-ARCH
3.3 3.4 3.5 3.6 3.7 3.8 3.9
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Figure 7.3: The CDF of detection latency of a system hang for both a
deadlock and NULL pointer de-reference.
7.4 Hang Detector Evaluation
In order to evaluate the functionality of the hang detector, we performed
fault injections using double spinlocks and NULL pointer dereferences to
hang the kernel. For these experiments, we used the Ubuntu 10.10 guest.
To measure the detection latency (the time from when a fault is injected
to when that fault is detected) and ensure the robustness of our detector
against race conditions, we repeated both the double spinlock and NULL
pointer dereference injections 1000 times each. For both fault types tested,
the detection coverage was 100% with 0 false positives and 0 false negatives.
The cumulative probability distribution for the detection latency is plotted
in Fig. 7.3.
We evaluated the performance benefits of dynamic monitoring with a con-
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Figure 7.4: Context switch microbenchmark. The baseline is a VM without
the hang detection monitor. The scheduler hook represents a na¨ıve
approach where a hook was always added to the scheduler. The last data
set represents the dynamic monitoring approach.
text switch microbenchmark.2 The benchmark measures the time the OS
takes to switch between two threads. Switching two threads will invoke
the scheduler but almost nothing else (i.e., no tasks that access devices or
change CR3). We ran the benchmark 30 times on a VM without any hooks,
with hooks always added to the scheduler (the na¨ıve approach), and with the
dynamic monitoring approach. From Fig. 7.4, we can see that the overhead
of the na¨ıve approach is significant, but by using our dynamic approach the
resulting overhead, even in a microbenchmark, is negligible. For comparison,
the experiments that executed hprobes for every scheduling event involved
3,002,135 probe invocations compared to only 50 for the dynamic monitoring
experiments. We also note that as was observed in previous experiments (see
Chapter 5), the newer generation hardware exhibits much lower VM Exit
overhead.
To gauge the performance impact of this detector on cloud applications,
we run three application benchmarks: a compile of Linux Kernel 2.6.35,
Apache Bench, and PostMark. Apache Bench and PostMark were both con-
figured and run through Phoronix Test Suite and all three were run 30 times.3
Apache Bench is used to represent a traditional webserver workload and is
2https://github.com/tsuna/contextswitch
3http://www.phoronix-test-suite.com/
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Figure 7.5: Application overhead comparing hang detection methods. The
na¨ıve approach hooks every schedule call. The final column is the dynamic
monitoring. Lower is better for all benchmarks.
evaluated in terms of requests per second. PostMark is used to measure disk
performance and is evaluated in terms of transactions per second. All of
these experiments were performed on an Ubuntu 10.10 VM. Fig. 7.5 shows
the results of this evaluation with error bards indicating the 95% confidence
interval of the mean.
All benchmarks were run with no monitor loaded, a na¨ıve monitor, and
with our dynamic hang detector. In Fig. 7.5 the impact of our hang detector
over the baseline is negligible in all three cases, reducing the mean perfor-
mance by 0.38%, 4.41%, and 0.34% for the kernel compile, Apache Bench,
and PostMark, respectively.
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Chapter 8
Return to User Attack Protection
8.1 Motivation
Return-to-user (ret2user) attacks are attacks where userspace code is exe-
cuted from a kernel context. An illustration of a ret2user attack is shown in
Fig. 8.1. Ret2user is a common mechanism by which kernel vulnerabilities
are exploited to escalate privileges, often using a NULL pointer dereference
or by overwriting the target of an indirect function call [104]. Ret2user is
simpler for attackers than using pure-kernel techniques like Return Oriented
Programming (ROP) since the attacker has full knowledge and control over
their shellcode in user space, and only needs to trick the kernel into execut-
ing that shellcode (as opposed to deriving kernel addresses or figuring out a
way to copy shellcode into kernel memory). Preventing the ret2user class of
attacks raises the effort needed to exploit a kernel vulnerability. If a ret2user
vulnerability cannot be used to escalate privileges, it can be used to crash a
system via a Denial of Service (DoS) attack by causing a kernel-mode excep-
tion. In most cases attackers would prefer the privilege escalation outcome,
but users are still harmed if an exploit attempt results in a crash/DoS. We
use the ret2user attack as an example of how to build a security detector for
the RSaaS framework that is based on OS constructs that apply to multiple
vulnerabilities.
8.2 Detector Design
A ret2user attack can be detected by checking if code in a user page is
executed from a kernel context. In Linux, the kernel’s pages are mapped into
every process’s address space at the same virtual addresses to reduce TLB
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Figure 8.1: A return to user attack. All code executed with system
privileges is gray. In this example, a vulnerability in a system call handler
causes kernel control flow to execute code in userspace with system
privileges. The dashed arrow is the execution of user code with kernel
privileges that is prevented by the detector presented in this chapter.
pressure for user/kernel context switches. While during certain operations
(e.g., disk I/O) the kernel is expected to copy data to/from user-level pages
in memory, the kernel is never expected to execute code inside user pages.
The ret2user detector works by forcing user pages to be non-executable while
the CPU is executing in a kernel context using EPT permissions. Trying to
execute userspace code will result in a VMExit back to the hypervisor.
In order to detect when userspace code is executed from a kernel context,
the ret2user detector must know when the guest is executing in kernel mode
(ring 0) and when it is executing in user mode (ring 3). Unfortunately,
changes to the Current Privilege Level (CPL) do not trap to the hypervisor.
Our ret2user detector overcomes this issue by identifying the valid entry and
exit points to and from the kernel. Hprobes are then added to those points
so the hypervisor can track whether the guest is executing in kernel or user
mode.
8.2.1 Return-to-User DAF Plugin
The parameters for the ret2user detector are the entry and exit points to and
from the kernel. In particular, we must be sure to infer all valid entry and
exit points in the kernel. This includes identifying the entry and exit points
that could be used during a ret2user attack. The OS constructs we use for
inferring the entry and exit points to and from the kernel are:
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1: procedure on instruction end(cpu state)
2: if last cpl == 3 && cpu state.CS.sel == 0 then
3: /*Transition from user to kernel*/
4: KERNEL ENTRIES ∪ cpu state.EIP
5: else if last cpl == 0 && cpu state.CS.sel == 3 then
6: /*Transition from kernel to user*/
7: /*The EIP of the previous instruction is a kernel address*/
8: KERNEL EXITS ∪ last eip
9: end if
10: last cpl ← cpu state.CS.sel
11: last eip ← cpu state.EIP
12: end procedure
Figure 8.2: Identifying kernel entry and exit points. The processor’s current
privilege level (CPL) is stored in the selector of the CS segment register.
1. The kernel runs in ring 0 and the user applications run in ring 3.
2. The kernel entry/exit points are finite and will not change across. re-
boots
In the DAF plugin for the ret2user detector, we track the CPL after each
instruction was executed and record the instruction pointer (the EIP register)
when the CPL transitions from 0→3 or 3→0. Note that since we want to
track the entry and exit points in the kernel (as the userspace transition
points are application dependent and non-deterministic), we use the address
of the previous instruction (a kernel address) for the 0→3 CPL transition as
opposed to the current instruction in EIP (a user address). The pseudocode
for the DAF plugin is shown in Fig. 8.2.
8.2.2 Return-to-User VMF Plugin
The runtime monitor for the ret2user detector adds hprobes to the kernel
entry and exit points obtained during the parameter inference step. After
the VM boots, we scan the guest page tables to identify which guest virtual
pages belong to the kernel (those page table entries have the User/Supervisor
bit cleared). Note that this process for scanning which pages belong to the
kernel could not be performed during the dynamic analysis step in the event
that kernel modules are loaded to different addresses or that the guest OS
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Figure 8.3: Ret2user attack detector. When the VM transitions from guest
user to guest kernel space, the in-VM hooks notify the hypervisor and the
hypervisor switches EPT address spaces. In the guest kernel address space,
EPT entries for guest user pages have the execute bit cleared to prevent
ret2user attacks. The VM controls its own page tables, but is isolated from
editing the EPTs.
uses Address Space Layout Randomization (ASLR) (we can compensate for
the changes in entry/exit points by using an offset from the SYSENTER EIP
MSR that contains the system call entry point, as discussed for OS hang
detection in Section 7.2).
After obtaining the virtual addresses for the kernel’s code pages, we create
a second set of EPTs in addition to the tables created by the hypervisor when
the guest was started. We then copy the last-level EPTEs to the new tables
so that the last-level entries still correctly point to the host pages containing
the VM’s data. When copying the last-level entries, we remove execute
permissions. We then add hooks to the VM at the obtained entry/exit points
for the kernel. We switch the set of active EPT tables at each transition:
we use the original tables while the guest is executing in user mode and the
second set of tables while the guest is executing in kernel mode. Fig. 8.3
illustrates the ret2user detector.
After removing execute permissions from the kernel’s pages in the second
set of EPT entries, an EPT VIOLATION VM Exit event is generated whenever
the guest executes code in guest kernel pages. We added a callback to KVM’s
handle ept violation function that handles those EPT violations. Inside
the callback we check the guest virtual address at which the EPT violation
occurred. If the EPT violation was generated by an attempt at executing
94
code in an address belonging to a user page, we know that a ret2user attack
was attempted. If the EPT violation resulted from execution in a kernel page,
then we remove execution protection for that page. In this way, the kernel
context is lazily built in the EPT structures. We note that this detection
scheme does not protect against new transitions from guest user space to
kernel space (i.e., those added by attackers and not discovered by the DAF
plugin). However, if the attack code returns to userspace, we could detect
that the kernel exit did not have a corresponding kernel entry. That said, all
the vulnerabilities we studied used the system call entry and exit points. If
the EPT violation was due not to an execute attempt but to an unrelated
read or write EPT violation (for example, if it was just the kernel loading
a page to a guest physical address that had not yet been used), then we
remove execute permissions from the page if it is a user page. This allows
us to maintain the behavior of the ret2user detector as new applications are
started. Note that in addition to editing permissions to detect vulnerabilities,
we synchronize the EPT tables across updates and also invalidate any entries
as they are updated (to avoid issues similar to having stale TLB entries).
8.3 Return-to-User Evaluation
The ability of the ret2user detector to detect attacks hinges on correctly
determining whether or not the VM is in user or kernel space. When in-
ferring parameters for the runtime detector, we boot the VM while running
dynamic analysis. Since we are performing dynamic profiling, it is impor-
tant to understand how workload dependent the analysis is. To test the
coverage of observed kernel entry/exit points, we profiled a test VM run-
ning CENTOS 5.0 (we chose this guest OS because it contained multiple
vulnerabilities). First, we collected the entry/exit points from a bootup and
shutdown sequence. Note that we can send an ACPI shutdown command
via system powerdown in QEMU to shut down the VM without user input.
To test whether a bootup/shutdown sequence is sufficient, we also measured
the entry/exit points with a Linux kernel source archive download, extrac-
tion, and compilation. This download, extract, compile workload exercises
the kernel entry/exit points one would expect to see during a VM’s lifetime:
downloading a file exercises the network and disk, while extracting and com-
95
restore_nocheck
system
_call
irq_entries_start
irq_entries_start*
irq_entries_start
irq_entries_start*
irq_entries_start
apic_tim
er_interrupt
device_not_available
general_protection
page_fault
100
101
102
103
104
105
106
107
108
N
u
m
b
e
r 
o
f 
In
v
o
ca
ti
o
n
s
User/Kernel Transitions for CENTOS5
Boot + Shutdown
Boot, Download, Extract, Compile and Shutdown
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irq entries start appears multiple times as each IRQ line represents a
unique kernel entry point (∗ denotes the transitions that only appeared
with the test workload).
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Table 8.1: Ret2user Vulnerabilities Detected
OS Vulnerability # Entries # Exits
CENTOS 5.0 CVE-2008-0600 7 1
CENTOS 5.0 CVE-2009-2692 7 1
CENTOS 5.0 CVE-2009-3547 7 1
Fedora 11 CVE-2009-2692 7 1
Ubuntu 10.10 CVE-2010-4258 6 1
piling are mixed cpu/disk/memory workloads involving the scheduling of
multiple processes.
The results of the kernel entry/exit point profiling experiments are shown
in Fig. 8.4. The only entry points that were observed during the kernel
workload and not during bootup/shutdown were entries used in IRQ han-
dling (those entries were activated 9 and 3 times). If needed, one could
supplement the entry points inferred by looking up interrupt handler entries
in the interrupt tables. All ret2user exploits we studied use the system call
entry point, including exploits involving vulnerabilities in the kernel’s inter-
rupt handling code.1 To measure the effectiveness of the ret2user detector,
we tested it against public vulnerabilities as shown in Table 8.1. We ob-
serve that in the kernels tested, we only identified one common exit point
into userspace. That said, by definition the ret2user detector cannot protect
against exploits that stay in kernelspace (e.g., those using pure-kernel ROP).
We currently do not implement any response techniques once an attack is
detected. The simplest mitigation is just to never restore execute permissions
to those pages and prevent the exploit from ever executing. However, that
simple mitigation technique may disrupt the OS’s execution if the kernel is
non-preemptible as the kernel thread handling the ret2user path may either
hang or triple fault (if the page fault gets forwarded to the VM).
The ret2user detector cannot be circumvented by a guest unless a user in
the VM compromises the hypervisor or creates a new kernel entry/exit point.
The ret2user detection technique is general and can detect ret2user exploits
using yet-to-be-discovered vulnerabilities. To highlight the significance of
ret2user attacks, Intel has released a similar protection in hardware called
Supervisor Mode Execution Protection (SMEP) or OS Guard (see Section
4.6 of the Intel Software Developer’s Manual [16]). SMEP effectively offers
1https://www.exploit-db.com/exploits/36266/
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protection similar to our detector, but since SMEP is configured by the guest
OS it (1) requires support in the guest OS, and (2) can be disabled by a
vulnerability in the guest OS [105,106]. Unlike SMEP, the ret2user detector
can also be used to protect VMs which are running legacy OSs (a common
virtualization use case) or on CPUs that do not support SMEP. This detector
is more flexible than SMEP, and if one wishes, one could change the criteria
for what is protected beyond pages that have the User/Supervisor bit (e.g.,
to restrict code from unapproved drivers or system calls [107]).
The ret2user detector triggers a VM Exit on every transition between
guest user and guest kernel space. To measure the overhead of the detector,
we ran a kernel uncompress and compile as well as a disk write and kernel
entry/exit microbenchmark. The disk write benchmark copies 256 MiB from
/dev/zero to /tmp (the buffer cache is cleared on every iteration) and the
microbenchmark is the same except it writes to /dev/null to remove any
disk latency and effectively exercises only kernel entry/exit paths.
The results of the performance measurements for ret2user are given in
Fig. 8.5. The microbenchmark exhibits roughly 20x overhead, but the kernel
workloads offer 0.15x overhead. Additionally, we reran the same filesystem
and web workloads from Section 7.4. The results for Apache Bench and
PostMark can be seen in Fig. 8.5. The ret2user detector adds 77.49% over-
head for Apache Bench and 42.68% overhead for PostMark, respectively. Our
technique’s ability to change its monitoring functionality at runtime makes it
an ideal platform for a future adaptive monitoring system [108]. The adap-
tive system could, for example, use more expensive security monitors (e.g.,
ret2user) only when lower overhead monitors detect suspicious activity (e.g.,
one sees gcc executed on a webserver) [67].
Vulnerabilities are common, but released infrequently on computing timescales.
As of writing, 192 privilege escalation vulnerabilities have been identified in
the Linux kernel since 1999, corresponding to roughly one new vulnerability
being announced every month.2 Even if an organization is using vulnerable
software, it is unlikely that every vulnerability discovered for that software
applies to the configuration used by that organization. However, clouds by
their nature are heterogeneous (many customers running various applications
and configurations). Therefore, a provider can reasonably expect that any
2https://www.cvedetails.com/product/47/Linux-Linux-Kernel.html?vendor_
id=33
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given vulnerability will apply to a subset of that provider’s users and enable
a detector like ret2user to mitigate risk before systems can be patched. A
performance cost during this period can be preferable to either running un-
patched systems or disrupting a system for patching. However, some users
may treat security as a top priority and protect against zero-day attacks by
running the detector continuously. Customers can chose to place different
detectors on their internet-facing and backend (e.g., database) servers. Since
our method modifies no guest OS state (other than adding hprobes) and can
be enabled at run time, VMs could also be live migrated to an analysis or
monitoring environment. In a cloud environment, therefore, it becomes de-
sirable to protect against high-impact vulnerabilities even if they are released
relatively infrequently. Similar to the motivation behind the Emergency Ex-
ploit Detector in Chapter 5, vulnerabilities are not guaranteed to be released
on a set schedule and can therefore be announced at any time: activating
any mitigation technique should aim for minimal disruption of both the users’
and provider’s systems.
8.4 Related Work
The ret2user detection in this chapter can be viewed as a subset of SecVi-
sor’s detection techniques [45]. Instead of Intel EPT, SecVisor uses the func-
tionally equivalent Nested Page Tables (NPT) from AMD to create isolated
address spaces for kernel and userspace. However, instead of inferring entry
and exit points, SecVisor modifies the guest kernel (requiring a recompile)
by adding hypercalls to inform the hypervisor about guest OS operation.
It should also be noted that SecVisor was implemented standalone and is
similar to Intel’s kernel guard [46]: SecVisor runs underneath a single guest
OS and does not support multiple VMs. Therefore, SecVisor is not suitable
for use in an IaaS cloud context (unless one uses performance costly nested
virtualization techniques [11]).
SecPod [109] is used to protect the guest kernel’s page tables. Like the VM
Exit techniques discussed in Chapter 3, SecPod ensures guest kernel space is
protected by reconfiguring the hypervisor to trap on privileged operations.
SecPod uses a secure address space for auditing the guest kernel’s paging
operations. This secure address space is transitioned to and from using spe-
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cial entry and exit gates that are added manually to the guest kernel. One
could use the techniques for detecting kernel entry and exit presented in this
chapter to implement SecPod-like functionality without modifying the guest
kernel. Parameter inference would discover all the paging functions and run-
time monitoring would hook on those functions. One would also enable the
same VM Exits SecPod uses to protect itself.
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Chapter 9
Process-based Keylogger Detection
9.1 Motivation
Many enterprise environments use Virtual Desktop Integration or VDI to
provide workstations for their employees. The difference between a tradi-
tional desktop environment and a VDI environment is illustrated in Fig. 9.1.
In VDI deployments, each user’s desktop environment is hosted on a remote
VM inside a datacenter or cloud. The user then connects to the VM image
using either a software or hardware thin client. VDI offers many advantages
including a simpler support model for (potentially global) IT staff and bet-
ter mitigation against data loss (e.g., from unauthorized copying of data to
external media). While VDI provides security benefits due to the isolation
offered by virtualization, VDI environments are still vulnerable to many of
the same software-based attacks as traditional desktop environments. One
such attack is a software based keylogger that records all keystrokes inside a
guest OS.
Process based keyloggers are keyloggers that run as processes inside the vic-
tim OS. These keyloggers represent a large threat as they are widely available
and easy to install due to portability. Previous work in keylogger detection
is built on looking at I/O activity as keyloggers will either send data to a
remote host or store the keystroke data locally until it can be retrieved. In
this section, we present a new detection method for process based keyloggers
that monitors for changes in the behavior of the guest OS [110].
The main concept behind detecting process-based keyloggers is quite sim-
ple: after a keystroke is passed into the guest OS, the keylogger process will
run to consume and record that keystroke. This keylogger process will run
in addition to any other processes that usually consume keystrokes (e.g. for
Windows, a system process like csrss.exe or the actual user application like
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In a traditional desktop infrastructure, a user has direct physical 
access to the desktop environment 
In a virtual desktop infrastructure, a user accesses a remote desktop 
environment hosted in a virtual machine
Figure 9.1: A comparison of a traditional enterprise desktop environment
and a desktop environment using Virtual Desktop Integration.
notepad.exe).
9.2 Keylogger Detection Parameter Inference
The DAF plugin for keylogger detection observes how the guest OS responds
to a hardware event from the keyboard. Just like physical keyboards con-
nected a desktop computer, a virtual keyboard connected to a VM will gener-
ate an interrupt which will then be processed by an interrupt service routine
(ISR). In x86, the ISRs are stored in the Interrupt Descriptor Table (IDT).
The goal of the DAF plugin is to identify which ISR is responsible for han-
dling keyboard interrupts as different VM instances may use different IDT
entries or even different virtual devices.
In order to identify the keyboard interrupt handler, we added a callback
to DECAF that tracks all hardware interrupts (DECAF INTR CB in Table 3.2).
We boot the VM in DECAF and send keyboard input to the VM. Using the
hardware interrupt callback, we determine the IDT entry for the keyboard
interrupt handler as well as the EIP of the keyboard interrupt handler. Even
though this analysis plugin uses keyboard input, we can send keyboard events
through software and can still perform parameter inference automatically
without user interaction. DECAF exports QEMU’s do sendkey function to
plugins. This function sends keyboard input to the emulated target using
the same internal codepaths as the normal virtual keyboard. The do sendkey
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function allows us to maintain the same aspect of the other detectors in only
needing a system boot to obtain the keyboard interrupt handling parameters.
9.3 Keylogger Detection Runtime Detector
The detector takes as its input the IDT entry number. When the keylogger
detector is enabled, a hook is then added to the ISR for the keyboard in-
terrupt as determined during the dynamic analysis step. Whenever a key is
pressed, the detector re-enables CR3 VM Exits and the CR3 values after the
keystroke are recorded and analyzed as described below.
As mentioned in the previous section, our goal is to detect the presence of
a keylogger based on changes in scheduling behavior. In order to do so, we
devised a metric based on the number of processes responding to a keystroke.
Each process-based keylogger uses slightly nuanced hooking methods (none
that we tested overrode IDT entries), but all of the keyloggers we tested get
scheduled shortly after a keystroke. This allows us to build a simple but
effective detection heuristic: the more processes (represented by CR3 values)
responding to a keystroke, the more likely it is that a keylogger is present.
We call the per-process metric we used to measure a keylogger the respon-
siveness score for that process. The responsiveness score is computed for
each process at every keystroke by exponential decay with a half-life of t1/2
as shown in Eq. 9.1:
Rk(CR3) = e
− ln(2) tCR3−tk
t1/2 (9.1)
Rk(CR3) is summed over every CR3 change after keystroke k and before
keystroke k+ 1. If that sum is ≥ 1 for any process, we count that process as
responding to keystroke k. While detector is running, we measure the mean
value of Rk across all processes and when it is greater than an expected
threshold (the threshold discussed during the evaluation below), we report
the presence of a keylogger.
In order to measure Rk(CR3) at runtime, we add a hook to the ISR re-
sponsible for keyboard events and re-enable CR3 VM Exits. We compute
compute Rk(CR3) in a separate analysis program running in userspace on the
hypervisor.
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9.4 Keylogger Detection Evaluation
In our experiments we use a half-life of t1/2 = 100ms. This was chosen based
on the perception time of the average person [111]. Note that this keylogger
detector is only an example detector for our RSaaS and not an exhaustive
study on keylogger detection, so it is likely that there exist better param-
eters or functions for measuring responsiveness. We tested the parameter
inference on Ubuntu 16.04, Windows 7, and Windows 8 and found that the
IDT entries for the keyboard were 0x31, 0x91, and 0x90, respectively. For a
more thorough evaluation we used a Windows 7 VM and tested the detector
against four keyloggers freely available from the Internet. The keyloggers we
tested were: Revelear Keylogger, Actual Keylogger, Spyrix Keylogger, and
Free Keylogger Platinum. We tested each keylogger with multiple workloads:
typing in notepad, browsing in Internet Explorer, browsing in Mozilla Fire-
fox, editing a spreadsheet, editing a slideshow presentation, and running ten
background processes while editing a document. We also ran the same work-
loads with no keylogger present and the Receiver Operating Characteristics
of our experiments are plotted in Fig. 9.2. We see that this basic keylogger
detector performs well, with a AUC of 0.95 (an ideal detector would have an
AUC of 1.0). We found that the false negatives came from experiments with
the Actual Keylogger in web browsing workloads. After inspecting our ex-
perimental data, the Actual Keylogger does not log keystrokes from Internet
Explorer and therefore was not detected.
Note that due to machine availability, the keylogger detection performance
benchmarks were conducted on a different platform than the other monitors.
The CPU was a 14 core Intel® Xeon™CPU E5-2683 v3 @ 2.00GHz and the
machine had 256 GB of LR-DIMM DDR4 memory operating at 2133 MHz.
To measure the performance impact of the keylogger detector, we ran two
desktop benchmarks from PCMark05: the general HDD benchmark and the
file decryption benchmark [112]. To simulate a desktop application workload,
we also ran the FutureMark Peacekeeper HTML5/Javascript browser bench-
mark with the Google Chrome web browser.1 The mean and 95% confidence
interval of the mean for the percent overhead of running 30 samples of each
benchmark are plotted in Fig. 9.3.
From Fig. 9.3, we see that the overhead from the keylogger detector in those
1http://peacekeeper.futuremark.com/
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Figure 9.2: Receiver operating characteristics for the keylogger detector on
Windows 7. The area under the curve was 0.95 (1.0 would represent a
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Figure 9.3: Benchmarks of the keylogger detector running on a Windows 7
VM.
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experiments is between 0% and %, with a large dispersion in the Peacekeeper
browser benchmark. We note that while representing a low overhead, these
performance numbers reflect an unrealistic worst-case scenario. The primary
cause of overhead during these benchmarks was re-enabling and logging all
CR3 VM Exits. As a performance improvement for production systems we
could disable CR3 VM Exits in between keystrokes after a certain threshold
(e.g., when the contribution to Rk would be negligible). However, doing
so would make benchmarking difficult as the performance impact would be
more dependent on the typing rate of the user, and at the time of writing we
did not have the ability to conduct performance tests involving users. We
also note that for the VDI use case, performance is not critical as long as the
system remains interactive since VDI deployments are not usually targeted
for graphics-intensive workloads.
9.5 Discussion
From Fig. 9.2, we see that the Keylogger detector has an optimal False Posi-
tive Rate of 0 for a threshold of mean R¯ = 1.69 yielding a True Positive Rate
of 0.77. Since keyloggers are usually long-lived processes, we can take this
conservative value and expect to detect the keylogger eventually. We note
that we have only thoroughly evaluated the keylogger detection for Windows
7. For other OSs, both the threshold R¯ and t1/2 will likely change. However,
using QEMU’s sendkey features, the parameter learning and tuning can oc-
cur outside of the VM, and therefore our abstraction of leaving the guest OS
untouched remains unbroken.
One limitation of this keylogger monitor is that it only detects process-
based keyloggers. There are indeed other classes of keylogger software (e.g.,
kernel-based or DLL based), but process based are the most common and
easiest to deploy.
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Chapter 10
Conclusions
In this dissertation, we presented a VM monitoring system that is supported
by dynamic hook-based monitoring. We presented a novel way for addressing
the semantic gap by bypassing that gap through the use of OS constructs.
Using the dynamic monitoring capabilities of hprobes and the ability to mon-
itor while leaving a cloud user’s VM undisturbed, we find this system suitable
for as-a-service reliability and security monitoring. In order to demonstrate
the range of functionality that could be provided using our VM monitoring
research, we presented multiple sample detectors that range from hang and
infinite loop detection to keylogger detection for Virtual Desktop environ-
ments.
The hprobe framework uses the int3 instruction, a simple and robust hook-
based VM monitoring technique that does incur VM Exit overhead. For
environments that have more stringent performance requirements, one could
use an in-VM hook-based monitoring platform, and further research is needed
to design a system to do so without requiring in-VM modifications [7, 109].
We stress that our RSaaS concept is independent of the specific hooking
mechanism as long as the hooks can be set to trap on arbitrary addresses
inside the VM. We chose VM Exits for the security properties and small
attack surface that they offer.
In the full RSaaS system, the parameter inference and runtime monitoring
steps are decoupled. As such, there is a certain level of trust in the guest OS.
If the integrity of the VM is not protected, an attacker could avoid monitors
by modifying the kernel code. Many of our detectors are designed to detect
attacks before those attacks modify the kernel level, so the effort required
for modifying kernel code has been increased when running our monitors.
Additionally, in many cases the monitoring hooks are triggered by expected
guest OS events and the absence of events from those actions could be a sign
that the system is under attack.
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The parameter inference step can be run oﬄine, on a copy of the VM
image, or online with a QEMU copy-on-write fork of the running VM image.
If needed, the DAF’s profiling can be based on the user’s workload if it is
configured to start at boot. Otherwise, one could live-migrate the VM after
starting the workload to the emulator-based analysis environment for a brief
profiling period [113]. Note that using snapshotting or live migration, one
can infer parameters that change across boot by performing dynamic analysis
on every VM startup (e.g., in the presence of ASLR or drivers being loaded
in non-deterministic order).
While our targeted application domain was an Infrastructure as a Ser-
vice cloud, our technique has broader applicability. In particular, large-scale
virtualized environments are common in enterprise IT. In 2013, of 1750 IT
leaders surveyed, only 5% of the respondents were not using virtualization
(1% were explicitly not using virtualization, 4% did not know) [114]. Our
runtime adaptable approach to monitoring is amenable to enterprise IT sys-
tems as those systems often have stringent uptime requirements and cannot
restart systems to integrate new monitoring functionality.
Our prototype was built on open-source software, but our technique is
compatible with closed-source commercial solutions. Tools exist to convert
commercial VM image formats to the formats supported and QEMU-based
DAFs. VMware offers its own hook-based VM monitoring solution [52].
Therefore, all the technology needed to port the presented framework to a
commercial system like VMware already exists.
10.1 Future Work
An important continuation of this work would be implementing interfaces
for the provider and customer and defining service-level agreements (SLAs)
to address what guarantees a customer can expect from the provider. The
provider could also use existing research on optimal monitor placement to
offer insight on which systems to monitor in a multi-VM architecture [115–
117].
When considering future architectures, it is important to note that the
properties of the detectors presented in this dissertation are based on general
systems and architectural principles. The hypervisor was used for monitoring
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since it is an integral component of the cloud and has strong isolation prop-
erties, but the monitoring techniques presented in this dissertation could be
used in a lightweight environment that only uses HAV for monitoring [45,46].
Furthermore, these monitoring techniques are fully applicable to contain-
ers [118] and future work should consider how to provide monitoring based
on the unique properties of container environments.
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Appendix A
Performance Comparison of Virtualization
Technologies
A.1 Motivation
This appendix largely comprises work from [119]. In that work, we explored
the performance cost of virtualization for sequence alignment software in
genomics. Sequence alignment offers an interesting use case for testing per-
formance as scientific applications are often considered too high-performance
to pay the cost of virtualization. In the full paper, we studied both the
Burrows-Wheeler Aligner [120] (BWA) and Novoalign [121]. In this section,
we present the results from BWA as it had a more significant response and
dependence on the virtualization technology.
A.2 Virtualization Technologies Tested
In addition to testing the performance of KVM, the virtualization technology
of choice for this thesis, we tested two other technologies that are often used
in cloud services: Xen and Linux Containers.
Xen is considered a full Type I hypervisor; even the “host” OS that has
direct access to the hardware and manages the other VMs runs inside a
special VM called “Domain 0.” Xen helped popularize the concept of para-
virtualization, where a modified version of the operating system is run to
avoid the unnecessary redundancy and overhead that come with providing
a full system (e.g., having to virtualize x86 instructions that are difficult to
virtualize) to the guest OS [14]. Xen is an important use case because the
most widely used public cloud IaaS platform, Amazon EC2, is built on top
of a modified version of Xen. While the results presented here may not be
representative of performance on EC2, Xen is still a popular hypervisor.
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Linux Containers (LXC) represent a different virtualization paradigm that
offers less isolation than a VMM. All containers share the same operating
system kernel [118]. The advantage of sharing an OS kernel means that
there is no device emulation and no duplicated effort of running an OS on
top of another OS. This method is not virtualization in the usual sense, but
containers can be used for many of the same reasons one would use virtual
machines (e.g., isolating applications and offering on-demand access to a set
of computing resources). The isolation provided by LXC is stronger than
usual OS process isolation, thanks to the use of the cgroups [122] and kernel
namespace features in Linux [123]. Kernel namespaces allow one to have
separate domains for certain kernel objects (i.e. processes, users, network
interfaces, and mounts) and cgroups allow one to allocate and partition re-
sources among different processes. The most popular and successful example
of LXC is in the open-source Docker project [124].
A.3 Experimental Setup
The experiments were performed on two classes of machines, a Dell Pow-
erEdge R720 server with dual-socket 8 core Intel Xeon E5-2660 “Sandy
Bridge” 2.20GHz CPUs (3.0GHz Turbo boost) with 20MiB of cache and
a homebuilt workstation computer with dual-socket 6 core Intel Xeon E5645
“Westmere” 2.40GHz CPUs (2.67 GHz Turbo boost) with 12MiB cache.
Since multiple machines were available, experiments were repeated on two
identical Dell R720 machines to rule out machine-specific bias and there was
no discernible difference between the two. The Dell servers had 128GiB of
DDR3-1333MHz memory and 8 1TiB ST91000640SS 6.0Gb/s SAS drives
arranged in a RAID 1+0 array. The RAID controller used (PERC H710P
Mini) has a 1024MiB battery backed cache, with the disk array set to the
default ‘write back’ mode. This server configuration represents a typical en-
terprise class large-memory server one could expect to find in a data center
or research cluster. The workstation has 32GiB of DDR3-1333Mhz memory
with a single 1TiB ST1000DM003 6.0Gb/s SATA hard drive. Throughout
this appendix, the Sandy Bridge Dell servers will be referred to as “Machine
1” and the homebuilt Westmere workstation as “Machine 2.” The hardware
specifications of each machine are summarized in Table A.1.
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Table A.1: Experimental Setup for Hypervisor Performance
Machine System Name CPU Memory Storage
Machine 1 Dell PowerEdge
R720
Dual-
socket
Intel Xeon
E5-2660
128GiB
DDR3-
1333MHz
8x1TiB
6.0Gb/s
SAS RAID
1+0
Machine 2 “Homebuilt”
workstation
Dual-
socket
Intel Xeon
E5645
32GiB
DDR3-
1333MHz
1TiB
6.0Gb/s
SATA
The libvirt API was used to configure and manage VMs for all platforms.
The VMs started as OpenStack instances based on the 12.04 LTS Ubuntu
cloud image.1 Both of the CPUs in the different machines support Intel VT-
x HAV technology with VT-d, and have support for EPT. Each VM was
allocated 8GiB of memory and 4 vCPUs.
Scientific applications use a large amount of input data from the disk, and
it is important to account for how this input data is cached. If one is using
virtual machine images that are layered on top of an existing filesystem (as
could be expected in a cloud environment utilizing the KVM hypervisor),
then both the VM operating system and host operating system could be
caching data, depending on how the VMM is configured. Therefore, it is
important to clear the buffer cache between all data samples to ensure that
each experiment starts in a similar state (one could also reboot the machines
to ensure a consistent state, but our experimentation has shown this to be
excessive). In these experiments, virtual machines were restarted and the
buffer cache was cleared before each sample.
Most modern multi-processors use a Non-Uniform Memory Access (NUMA)
architecture. In a NUMA architecture, different processors/cores communi-
cate with different regions of memory at different speeds, with fastest access
to “local” memory and slower access to “non-local” memory (typically on a
different socket). For optimal performance, a process should run on a CPU
that has local access to the memory that process is accessing. Most modern
OS schedulers are aware of NUMA, but one can still direct the OS to only
run a process on a certain set of CPUs by “pinning” the process to those
1http://cloud-images.ubuntu.com/precise/
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Figure A.1: Results from 30 samples (10 on Machine 2) of running BWA on
simulated paired-end Chromosome 1 reads on one virtual machine with the
hypervisors in default configuration for Ubuntu 12.04. The x-axis indicates
the hypervisor and the error bars indicate the 95% confidence interval. (a)
Machine 1 (Sandy Bridge R720), where the physical server took a mean of
1955.49 seconds to complete the alignment. (b) Machine 2 (Westemere
workstation), where PHY took a mean of 2460.09 seconds to complete.
(Note that even though XEN-pv has a normalized runtime of 0.99, the
confidence intervals of PHY and XEN-pv overlap.)
CPUs (e.g. by using the taskset command in Linux) [125].
A.4 Initial Measurements
The results of running single-threaded BWA 30 times on all four execution
environments (physical server, Kernel Virtual Machine, para-virtualized Xen,
and Linux Containers) are shown in Fig. A.1a. In this test, the input data
consisted of paired-end 75bp reads sampled uniformly from human chromo-
some 1 (sourced from the UCSC hg19 reference2) with 2x coverage using the
ART Illumina read simulator [126]. Here, we see that LXC’s performance
closely matches that of the physical server, but Xen and KVM have measur-
able overhead, with KVM’s being significant.
2http://hgdownload.soe.ucsc.edu/goldenPath/hg19/chromosomes/chr1.fa.gz
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A.5 Tuning KVM for Performance
From Fig. A.1a, we saw that KVM had the high overhead of roughly 20%
on both machines. To investigate the cause of this overhead, we start with
recommended tuning practices for KVM [127]. The results of KVM tuning
are summarized in Fig. A.2. As sequence aligners are memory-intensive
applications, improving memory performance should have a positive effect
on application performance. Furthermore, since these applications also work
with large files, we also investigate parameters for tuning disk performance.
One technique to improve memory performance is to reduce the number of
TLB misses by using “huge” pages, or memory pages larger than the system’s
default. Traditionally, huge pages would need to be reserved by the OS at
boot time, but transparent huge pages (THP) can be dynamically assigned
by the OS heap and stack space for an application. Data points designated
with “THP” (see Fig. A.2) had THP enabled and we see that THP offers
modest performance gains, depending on the machine type.
Though the paravirtualized virtio drivers were used for KVM (vs. full
device emulation in QEMU), there was some tuning left. The libvirt API
defaults to using QEMU worker thread pools to emulate an asynchronous I/O
(AIO) system. On recent Linux kernels support for native AIO is offered.3
Experiments using native Linux AIO are designated by “aio” in Fig. A.2.
We see that using native AIO is helpful in reducing the mean time on both
machines. In addition to AIO, we also tested different file caching strategies,
but we found that the cache=‘none’ chosen by OpenStack when creating the
VM image to yield the best performance.
As mentioned earlier, modern CPUs (sockets) can have asymmetric mem-
ory access times to different memory regions. A specific region of memory
(e.g., memory associated with CPU socket 0) is called a NUMA node. In
our experiments, we observed that in the default configuration roughly half
of a VM’s pages would reside on one NUMA node, and the other half of a
VM’s pages would reside on the other node (both types of machines we used
had two CPU sockets and therefore two NUMA nodes). In order to prevent
processors from accessing memory non-local to their NUMA node, one can
restrict virtual CPUs to a set of physical CPUs. In Fig. A.2, the “pin” data
3Seehttp://www.linux-kvm.org/page/Virtio/Block/Latencyandhttps://www.
ibm.com/support/knowledgecenter/linuxonibm/liaat/liaatbpkvmasynchio.htm
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Figure A.2: Results from 10 samples of running BWA on the KVM
hypervisor with various tuning options. PHY indicates the physical server
and KVM indicates KVM with a “default” configuration. THP signifies the
hypervisor had Transparent Huge Pages enabled, aio signifies that the VM
was using Linux native asynchronous I/O, and pin indicates the VM was
pinned to CPUs on the same NUMA node. (a) Machine 1 (Sandy Bridge
R720), where the physical server (PHY) took a mean of 1955 seconds to
complete the alignment. (b) Machine 2 (Westemere workstation), where
PHY took a mean of 2460 seconds to complete.
points refer to runs where vCPUs were manually pinned to a specific NUMA
node.
We see that with all of these tuning parameters the performance overhead
of KVM was brought down from 20% to 4%. There still may be other ways
to increase the performance, but it is important to realize that the over-
head of virtualization can be significantly dependent on not only the type of
virtualization, but also the physical hardware and configuration of the VMM.
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